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Preface  
This master thesis is a part of a five-year Master degree in Strategy and Management at the 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH). The master thesis is 
also part of the research project: "A local cluster going international: Balancing local and non-
local networking?" financed by the Research Council of Norway, NCE Subsea and NCE 
Maritime and led by Inger Beate Pettersen. The master thesis concentrates on Aker Subsea 
and the service department Subsea Lifecycle Support, which is a part of Aker Solutions.  
 
Knowledge governance is fundamentally important for companies striving for 
competitiveness. During the master thesis period, the world witnessed an environmental 
disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. An oilrig owned by British Petroleum (BP) exploded, killing 
11 people and spilled huge amounts of oil into the sea. Oil companies have recently 
experienced the vulnerability of their advanced technology. Knowledge governance through 
procedures, such as sharing and creation of best practice and quality, is a subject particularly 
applicable in such a situation. Global certification procedures will probably be in focus 
throughout the cleanup process related to this manmade disaster. This disaster will hopefully 
give Aker Subsea an extra motivation to invest in effective knowledge flow and sharing of 
experiences, both to avoid similar disasters and to become the preferred subsea partner 
through competitive advantage.  
 
It has been very interesting to study the knowledge-related initiatives Aker Subsea does on the 
surface to master the deep. I would like to thank the employees at Aker Subsea who have 
participated in interviews; especially Vice President in Lifecycle Technology, Odd-Egil Haug, 
he has been very helpful giving me entry into his organization. In addition, I would like to 
thank Inger Beate Pettersen, who established contact with Aker Solutions. Finally, I would 
also like to thank my supervisor, Associate Professor Svein Ulset at NHH, for valuable 
discussions and feedback along the way.  
 
Bergen, 20 June 2010  
Pål-Vemund Vermedal
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Summary 
The purpose of this study is to examine knowledge flows and coordination problems 
experienced by Aker Subsea. We apply theories on international strategy and organizational 
structure to analyze Aker Subsea´s knowledge governance. 
The subsea value chain consists of five elements: development, production, construction, 
installation and subsequent aftermarket services. Product groups and local service bases for 
specific fields and oil companies carry out these activities. The research problem deals partly 
with inefficient knowledge flow and coordination along the value chain, and partly of 
inefficient sharing of best operating practice between service bases located in different foreign 
oil provinces. The vertical knowledge flow along the value chain is the major issue in the 
study. 
Aker Subsea, as a part of Aker Solutions, has recently changed their international strategy 
from one of being a global transnational organization to one of becoming a regionalized 
international actor. Yet, the focus is to maintain global benefits through standardizing and by 
using common procedures and processes. This new strategy has a clear impact on how to 
approach knowledge governance that contributes to an efficient knowledge flow between 
product groups and different service bases worldwide.  
This study focuses mainly on the service department in Aker Subsea, Aker Subsea Lifecycle 
Services (Aker SLS), and takes the perspective of Aker SLS personnel working in the 
Norway-Africa region (Oslo, Ågotnes and Angola). This region includes service bases in 
Angola and Ågotnes (Norway) as well as SLS Headquarters (HQ) in Oslo. Recently, SLS 
established a Cross-Functional Integration team (CFI team) called Lifecycle Technology (LT) 
as an intermediary between product groups and service bases. 
The product groups develop technology and systems through projects delivered to service 
bases for further operations. Knowledge flow, effective coordination and communication 
between the product groups and the service bases are essential in order to offer the best 
technology to the customer. To gain empirical knowledge of the phenomenon of knowledge 
governance I conducted 11 interviews with 13 employees from the two service bases, SLS/LT 
and one specific product group.  
Aker Subsea’s organizational structure is a reflection of its international strategy in terms of 
role clarifications, distribution of authority and mandate, and the interaction between the units
(service bases, product groups and SLS/LT). These are ongoing processes in the company; the 
organizational structure has been diagrammed and different aspects have already been 
implemented. 
In the new project model, product groups and service bases are better integrated. The project-
based organizational structure is vital for the involvement of both product groups and 
services. This involvement is important to achieve effective interaction and knowledge 
creation through projects. For routine operations, it is a matter of how much power should be 
exercised by the different service bases and how much exercised by a central authority 
(SLS/LT). The company has to clarify the needs of power distribution to a greater degree. 
The establishment of Lifecycle Technology (LT) as an intermediary between service and 
product development contributes to increase coordination. LT ensures that organizational 
entities jointly carry out activities and develop a common understanding of each other’s 
challenges and needs. The organizational structure is divided into three layers: project-based, 
operations-based and knowledge-based. This division is based on a theoretical framework and 
LT is defined as the knowledge base in Aker SLS throughout the study. LT collects 
knowledge from different bases and fields, and disseminates it to the product groups, and vice 
versa. 
Since both the strategic change and the organizational structure are relatively new 
(implemented in 2009), it is too early to conclude whether these work effectively for the 
company as a whole. The study bases conclusions on the progress up until June 2010 as well 
as on the company´s intentions and ambitions for knowledge governance.
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and research problem 
The purpose of this study is to examine knowledge flow and coordination problems 
experienced by Aker Subsea, and to examine, through theory on international strategy and 
organizational structure as theoretical framework, its approach to knowledge governance.   
The research problem concerns inefficient coordination along the value chain consisting of 
product development, production, construction, installation and subsequent aftermarket 
services carried out by product groups and local service bases, respectively, for specific fields 
and oil companies. In addition, it concerns inefficient sharing of best operating practice 
between service bases located in different foreign oil provinces. 
This research problem will be answered by first analyzing Aker Subsea´s organizational 
structure and its different knowledge processes. Subsequently, the study goes into detail 
regarding how the newly established central service support can contribute to coordination of 
knowledge flow between product groups and service bases. 
 
1.2 Introduction of Aker Subsea´s problem and their solution  
Aker Subsea is a part of Aker Solutions. Aker Subsea is described in this study as having 
eight product groups and eight service bases. This is a simplified picture of the organization, 
but sufficient for the purpose of this study. The main focus is on the service department in 
Aker Subsea called Subsea Lifecycle Support (SLS), which includes all service bases and the 
Lifecycle Technology (LT) department. 
1.2.1 Aker Subsea’ s problem 
Prior to the late 1990s, Aker Solutions was region oriented, but through a multidomestic 
strategy. In the late 1990’ s it drew up a global strategy and was a global, standardized 
business until 2009, when it regionalized its operations on a global basis.   
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Figure 1: Aker Solutions’ strategic choices
The table below illustrates the company’s strategic development: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aker Subsea’s global strategy evolved into a transnational form with a matrix structuring. The 
matrix structure resulted in a highly complex reporting system. This organizational structure 
did not sufficiently allow for handling the products’ lifecycle through clear roles, ownership 
and coordinating knowledge flow between the different units. Product groups and service 
bases were fragmented and autonomous, and were only coordinated through various projects. 
Aker Subsea is a project-oriented company that delivers products and systems to the 
customer’s field through projects. Products are developed and tested before they are delivered 
to the customer (oil company). When products are delivered to the customer, the related 
project is handed over from project management to the service base located in the region. In 
several projects, handovers have been badly executed, followed by repudiation of liability 
with regard to support and follow-up. The lines of communication and support have been 
unclear towards what formerly was called “After Market Services” (now Subsea Lifecycle 
Services). Best practice from projects has not been preserved and therefore has not been 
explicitly used in later projects. The vertical problem between projects/product groups and 
service bases consists of both organizational and coordinating issues.   
Service bases worldwide have not seen the usefulness of regular contact with each other 
because of differences in customer (oil companies) needs. Knowledge and routines of 
standard operational procedures have largely been developed at individual bases. Autonomous 
service bases spread across the world have often rapidly led to differences in handling 
operations and the same mistakes have been made at several locations.  Sharing of best 
practice is difficult to facilitate if bases are not sufficiently coordinated. How to  distribute 
  Strategy Multidomestic Global/
Transnational
Internalization/ 
Transnational
  Organizational 
  Structure
Autonomous 
Bases
Standardization and 
a m atrix structure
Hypertext
structure with CFI
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  Decision -making 
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authority (how much centrally and how much locally at each service base) is therefore a key 
question. 
1.2.2 Aker Subsea’s solution 
The regionalized international strategy primarily sought to customize Aker Subsea’s 
operations in a better way than previously and to give each region clearer fields of 
responsibility. Aker Subsea has to deal with how they can regionalize their global strategy and 
still ensure that the organizational structure is compact and integrated. The organizational 
structure is meant to reflect their strategy. 
In addition to the strategic change, Aker Subsea´s central service support function was 
renamed Lifecycle Technology (LT) and staffed with employees covering competencies of all 
products in Aker Subsea. This change came about mainly because not all service bases have 
engineers, and they therefore need to have access to engineering support from LT. Such a 
central support function enables Aker Subsea to realize gains through coordinating solutions 
and expertise across the value chain: (1) Vertically in terms of being a supporting and 
coordinating function in projects as well as having regular dialogue with product groups 
regarding the needs and issues of service bases; (2) Horizontally in terms of gathering, 
preserving and spreading best practice and relevant information to the service bases. The 
figure below shows LT´s position as an intermediary between product groups and service 
bases. 
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Aker Subsea has started to improve their organizational structure by focusing on knowledge 
governance in order to handover projects to service bases more smoothly and to develop 
closer interaction between units. Service personnel are getting more involved in projects to 
improve on the required competencies for the products in a project handover. The goal is to 
improve the governance and management of knowledge so that products and services are 
more coordinated.  
 
1.3 Structure and composition of the case study 
The concept knowledge governance is the central topic in this study and is defined as 
structures and processes developed or put in place to implement, coordinate and handle both 
tacit and explicit knowledge in the organization. In this study, the concept also deals with 
distribution of decision-making authority and responsibilities towards the subsea products’ 
value chain. The concept is hereafter abbreviated as KG. 
Aker Subsea’s switch to its international strategy influences the organizational structure in 
terms of authority and coordination of different units. Theory on international strategy and 
KG will guide the following analysis of Aker Subsea, with focus on its service activities.  
Figure 2: The connection between product groups, SLS/LT and service bases 
SLS/LT
USA
Angola
Brazil
Ågotnes
Malaysia
Australia
UKSystem
Controls
XMT
WOS & Tooling
Tie‐in & Structure
Umbilical
Risers
Wellhead
Product groups Service bases
India
SNF Report No. 24/10 
5 
 
The theoretical framework on organizational structure derives from Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995). The authors describe a structure that allows for organizational knowledge creation. 
This structure includes three layers: project team, business system (routines) and knowledge 
base. These layers fit well into this study because Aker Subsea is project oriented in their 
operations, but also includes in the project layer routine work at the service bases. The 
knowledge base layer in Aker Subsea SLS is defined to be its newly established Cross-
Functional Integration team (CFI team), LT. LT as a CFI team will be analyzed in order to see 
how such a team can contribute to creating a simpler, clearer and more systematic support and 
knowledge flow in Aker Subsea. The theoretical framework on CFI team is derived from 
industrial marketing and product development. This part will describe important 
organizational factors related to Aker Subsea’s aim to increase focus on the products’ 
lifecycle through the value chain. 
 
The research model is illustrated below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main point of this model is to elucidate the relationship between choice of international 
strategy and organizational structure, and to elucidate the effect on KG in terms of sharing 
and coordinating knowledge and information. It is important that these KG structures are 
Figure 3: Research model 
Organizational KM 
structure
Business system;
authority 
(Future) effect on
KG
International 
strategy
Project team ; 
lifecycle mindset
Knowledgebase ; 
CFI team
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balanced against each other to achieve an effective and efficient knowledge development and 
knowledge flow within the company.  
1.3.1 The differentiation between knowledge flow and assistance 
LT acts as both a competence hub and a capacity buffer for the service bases. Not every SLS 
unit needs to have specialists within all product areas (competence) and LT can support both 
engineering and project execution during periods with high workload at service bases 
(capacity). It is therefore important to point out a difference between knowledge flow and 
assistance through problem solving. A practical example of the difference in these two terms 
would be a case in which employees from LT assist a service base on a technical job that the 
service base struggles with due to a lack of competence or due to capacity constraints. In this 
case, LT assists the customer directly, and therefore the service base does not benefit from 
gaining new knowledge through learning. This study will focus on the sharing of knowledge 
from a governance perspective. This perspective includes a focus on types of knowledge flow 
where LT´s role is more as a coordinator than as an executor. One type of knowledge flow I 
discuss is how operational knowledge (e.g., procedures and routines) is shared by service 
bases with a service support center with the intention of spreading this knowledge to other 
bases in terms of best practice and adjustments in working routines. Another example 
concerns vertical knowledge flow where product groups create, through projects, knowledge 
in terms of new technology and systems. This knowledge is shared with base personnel who 
are supposed to install, operate and maintain the technology. Such knowledge is shared both 
explicitly, through manuals and instructions, and tacitly, through integrated testing and 
training on the system. 
 
1.4 Practical limitations 
This case study focuses on Aker Subsea´s Norway-Africa region, service bases in Angola and 
Ågotnes, and on SLS/LT centrally. Aker Subsea´s regions are described more in detail in the 
Case Description (part 5). LT is defined in this context as an engineering support center/unit 
in Oslo. A unit called Rental Tool Pool (RTP) is also part of LT, but is not considered in this 
study.  
Concerning the scope of the study and schedule, as well as access within Aker Subsea, the 
Norway-Africa region has been a natural focus area. After the service base in India, the 
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Norway-Africa region ranks second in activity for LT and thus probably also ranks second in 
level of feedback. In addition to inputs by respondents from LT and service bases in the 
Norway-Africa region, inputs by respondents from one product group will help in 
understanding their respective roles towards SLS. Nevertheless, we may have lost important 
arguments because we focus on only one of eight product groups. 
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2. Theoretical perspective 
KG is a relatively new field of research; few studies have looked at this part of knowledge 
management (KM). KG integrates theoretical aspects of both knowledge management and 
organizational governance. Companies interested in managing their knowledge effectively, to 
enhance organizational performance and competitiveness, need to create structures and 
processes to manage the wide range of knowledge activities.  
The concept KG in this study is defined as structures and processes developed or put in place 
to implement, coordinate and handle both tacit and explicit knowledge in the organization. 
Polyani (1962) first proposed the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge, which are 
concepts widely used in research. Tacit knowledge is defined as personal knowledge, 
experimental and context specific. Explicit knowledge is knowledge that has been codified, 
articulated and published in some way.  
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) have designed a model for knowledge conversion processes that 
connects both tacit and explicit knowledge (figure 4 below). Sharing knowledge is 
fundamental to the establishment of best practice, the creation of new knowledge and the 
achievement of common learning. Primarily, this sharing is achieved through tacit to tacit 
communication, but it is clear that knowledge sharing can also be achieved through a tacit to 
explicit to tacit conversion loop, as shown in the figure below. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scholars and others agree that we know far more than we can make explicit (Polanyi, 1966).  
Figure 4: Knowledge conversion processes (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995)
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To engage in knowledge sharing requires interaction and communication between the sharing 
and the receiving units. Compatible practices thus affect whether and how knowledge 
developed by one unit can be shared with and used by other units (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 
Adenfelt and Lagerström, 2006). This study attempts to describe the governance structure and 
processes required to succeed in sharing knowledge.  
The literature examined for this study often stresses the importance of KG. Other literature 
does not specifically refer to the concept of governance, but rather emphasizes certain aspects 
of the topic, such as the importance of strong leadership to the success of Knowledge 
Management initiatives (Chourides et al., 2003, Pan and Scarborough, 1999, Storey and 
Barnett, 2000), and the role of top executives as role models (Davenport et al., 1998, Mason 
and Pauleen, 2003), as knowledge architects and as catalysts (Inkpen, 1996). 
 
2.1 The company's choice of international strategy 
Aker Subsea has recently changed their global strategy and new strategy influences its 
approach to KG in terms of coordination and governance of the various service bases and 
product groups. 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) describe four strategies that companies may use when competing 
across borders: (1) multidomestic, (2) international, (3) global and (4) transnational.  
A multidomestic strategy is a strategy in which the foreign entities are highly independent, 
acting as autonomous subsidiaries. This autonomy enables them to react quickly to changes in 
local markets. However, this is a strategy where there is likely to be little contact and 
exchange of knowledge and experiences between the various subsidiaries.  
The international strategy is different from the multidomestic strategy in that it involves more 
centralized strategic management and R&D. Centrally developed products and technologies 
are adapted to local conditions, and more coordination is required from the HQ than is 
required in the multidomestic strategy. Some decision making is decentralized, but there is 
still more control from HQ than in the multidomestic strategy. 
The global strategy is a strategy where actions and procedures in the subsidiaries are highly 
regulated and controlled by HQ. This approach ensures the achievement of global efficiencies 
through economy of scale. Global strategies are particularly effective in markets  where 
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products are not very differentiated and transaction costs are low. The transnational strategy 
aims to "think globally, act locally," as the slogan goes, through a dynamic interdependence 
between the parent/HQ and the subsidiaries. Organizations that use a transnational strategy to 
coordinate their work ensure local flexibility while exploiting the benefits of global 
integration and efficiency. In addition, the worldwide spread of innovation is ensured. 
Responsibility is spread throughout the activities and locations, and matrixes are developed on 
these dimensions. This is a much more complex form of organization than the other three 
above.  
2.1.2 Centers of Excellence  
Aker Subsea has defined their product groups (located in Norway) as Centers of Excellence 
regarding the product technology and has defined SLS in Norway (including the service base 
at Ågotnes and SLS/LT at HQ in Oslo) as the Center of Excellence regarding subsea 
operations and service. According to Holm and Pedersen (2000), a Center of Excellence 
(CoE) is defined as follows:  
A subsidiary is “excellent” if it has some kind of distinct competence that gives it a 
competitive advantage in relation to competition in the market. This competence can be 
related to its capability within production, product development, marketing and/or other 
functional areas. Subsidiaries are “centers” in the Multinational Company (MNC) if the 
subsidiary competence is of use for other MNC units. Thus, the excellence must relate to the 
activities or development of other MNC units. Such CoEs are subsidiaries/units, which have 
special expertise in a specific field, and this expertise will benefit the entire company. Such a 
definition of competence fields has become widely used by companies.  
CoEs often influence the long-term trends in the company through sharing of knowledge and 
strategic decisions (Holm & Pedersen, 2000). 
 
2.2 Organizational Structure for effective KG  
Aker Subsea is defined as a Multinational Company (MNC) and its choice of international 
strategy determines its organizational structure. An increasingly important share of MNCs’ 
sharing of knowledge is not necessarily just one-way (from HQ to subsidiaries), but two-way, 
or even in multiple directions (Cantwell, 1994).  
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Since the mid-1980s, it has been argued that since subsidiaries are becoming more 
knowledgeable, MNCs have been moving away from hierarchical and bureaucratic models 
where knowledge flows top-down from the HQ. The movement has been towards a model 
often referred to as heterarchy, which is an "integrated network" and characterized by strong 
lateral connections and interactions across units (Hedlund, 1986). The role of HQ is to design 
process architecture rather than to exert control in the classical hierarchical sense. This lack of 
formal authority forces knowledge networks to depend on convincing arguments and 
experience rather than on authoritative selection and implementation (Ulset & Gooderham, 
2007).  
Based on the knowledge conversion model described above, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
developed the concept of a Hypertext organizational structure. Hypertext organizational 
structure is based on the efficiency of the bureaucracy model’s hierarchy (standardization and 
formalization), combined with creativity, flexibility and dynamic characteristics of the project 
model (Heterarchy). Aker Subsea is a project-oriented company but also includes operational 
routines and regular business at the service bases. Therefore, the hypertext organizational 
structure, which focuses on organizational knowledge creation and coordination, is well suited 
for this study. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) describe Hypertext organizational structure as having three 
layers:  
1. Business system layer: This is where routine operations are performed (e.g., service 
base operation). The business system layer operates along the bureaucratic model, and 
products and services are delivered here. This is where we find the great diversity of 
tacit knowledge in the organization. Business system is the part of the organization 
that deals directly with the customer and with the organization's operating 
environment – that is where "rubber meets the road" and where the reality of the 
business is truly known.  
2. Project team layer: This is where knowledge-based tasks, such as developing new 
products, are carried out. This layer operates according to a taskforce model where 
people are drawn from their normal duties to join a project with a specific purpose and 
perspective for implementation. This layer is where knowledge conversion takes 
place, converting tacit knowledge from individuals from the business system layer and 
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engaging that knowledge to develop new concepts, ideas and products (processes or 
services). When the project is completed, the individuals return to their normal roles 
and responsibilities within the business system layer.  
3. Knowledge base layer (SLS/LT): Here, knowledge generated in the two layers above 
is codified and stored to ensure availability for everyone in the organization. The most 
effective organizational knowledge base is structured around the organization's 
intent/vision and long-term goals. Within this layer, new knowledge is re-categorized 
and re-contextualized to make it more accessible and more valuable to as many 
individuals and business units as possible. Thus, new "soft" knowledge – such as 
culture, interaction and relations – is as valuable as new "hard" knowledge – such as 
technology and manufacturing processes.  
The success of a Hypertext organization is in the ability it affords individuals to move 
seamlessly into and out of each of these three layers. The hierarchical model makes it difficult 
to pull out the tacit knowledge, while the project structure (taskforce) further complicates the 
work of pulling out the explicit knowledge. According to the knowledge conversion model by 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), a Hypertext structure is bureaucratic/hierarchical through 
internalization and combination of knowledge, and task force/heterarchical by generating new 
knowledge through socialization and externalizing. New thinking concerning Hypertext is that 
a knowledge base categorizes and conceptualizes new knowledge in line with the 
organization's vision, culture and technology. For Aker Subsea, this knowledge base is 
defined in this study as LT. 
One of LT’s tasks as a knowledge base for the service bases is precisely to categorize and to 
conceptualize knowledge and information.  
Criticism of the Hypertext organizational structure theory concerns its failure to give a clear 
picture of how authority should be distributed to achieve the company´s strategy. 
Responsibilities and the extent of the knowledge bases’ mandate must be clearly defined. 
Furthermore, a decision must be made regarding whether and to what extent units or 
subsidiaries should be governed. And or whether they should have decision-making authority 
and if so, how much, even for follow-up and implementation of initiatives and best practice.  
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2.3 Knowledge base layer: Cross-Functional Integration team (CFI team) 
Literature on Cross-Functional Integration (CFI) teams deals with the establishment of a 
knowledge base. Integration of various disciplines has been popular in many organizations 
(Adler, 1995, Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). CFI is defined as the extent of interaction and 
communication, level of information sharing, the degree of coordination, and extent of joint 
involvement across functions (Song and Montoya-Weiss, 2001).  
A CFI team is a team in which employees with several forms of functional competence are 
gathered. This organic structure allows team members to realize their tacit knowledge in the 
development of new products/services through utilizing the team's knowledge. Therefore, the 
structure represents a comprehensive recognition and understanding of how to achieve the 
development of new goals. This structure enhances expertise across disciplines and is adapted 
to the needs of a project-based team (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1990). However, such a team can 
be more or less permanent, as the case shows in the study. CFI facilitates communication, 
collaboration, sharing of information, coordination and cooperation between functions in the 
development of products and services (Song and Montoya-Weiss, 2001). Porter (1998) argues 
that the unlocking of competitive advantage from dispersed activities must be coordinated 
globally. Such coordination will ensure consistency and reinforcement between the countries.  
Knowledge is not just an individual occurrence, but also a team's incidence (Dixon, 2000). A 
person's tacit knowledge can be transformed into the person's group's tacit knowledge or 
collective knowledge – a group's "know-how” which can be used to solve problems in 
different business contexts (Spender, 1996). Tacit knowledge embedded in individual 
employees is not fully functional unless the team uses the specific processes that facilitate 
transformation of collective tacit knowledge. This transformation is in line with the model 
above by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) concerning the knowledge conversion for purposes of 
socialization. Since CFI is an organic structure that engages various features/areas, knowledge 
can be preserved in the CFI team to improve and enhance “retrieval cues", and thus help to 
spread knowledge and improve the team’s decision-making processes (Rulke and 
Galaskiewicz, 2000). This structural approach can accelerate the exchange of knowledge 
through cognitive and social processes (Griffith et al., 2003, Madhavan and Grover, 1998).  
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2.3.1 Theoretical framework for coordination through CFI teams 
The theoretical framework on CFI teams largely derives from an article by Hirunyawipada et 
al. (2009), titled Cross-functional integration as a knowledge transformation mechanism: 
Implications for new product development. Much of their framework fits well in this study 
because it deals with the creation of such a cross-functional service team. The aim is to 
increase coordination between and to establish closer relationships amongst product groups 
and service bases. The theoretical framework described in this article is recent (2009) and 
serves as a motivation to put new theoretical research into practice. The drawback is that little 
research exists for comparison purposes.  
A basic prerequisite for tacit to collective knowledge transformation is socialization. 
Although the CFI team possesses some advantages, formation of such teams alone does not 
improve socialization. Hirunyawipada et al. (2009) identified different team-specific 
individual factors that come into play and affect each other in a CFI team. The individual 
factors are common knowledge, functional expertise and network centrality. These three 
important factors influence the transformation of tacit to collective knowledge through the 
socialization process in a CFI team (Burt et al., 1998, Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, Sobek et 
al., 1998). Firms should consider these three factors when forming teams. Otherwise, 
suboptimal team socialization process can become a barrier to the effectiveness of knowledge 
transformation. These factors will be included in the study to analyze LT as a coordinating 
team.  
The framework by Hirunyawipada et al. (2009) also includes several team-level factors: goal 
congruence, team cohesion (task cohesion and interpersonal cohesion) and transformational 
leadership. We treat transformational leadership with respect to LT, while goal congruence 
will be analyzed over the whole of Aker Subsea (SLS/LT, two of the eight service bases and 
one of the eight product groups). We analyze the team cohesion factor with respect to SLS 
(service bases and LT). In the figure 5 below, we illustrate the application of the framework: 
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Figure 5: CFI factors influencing knowledge transformation 
 
 
 
The above adjustment in the theoretical framework enables us to answer how LT as a 
coordinating CFI team can handle knowledge flow more efficiently. And we explain this by 
both internal factors and factors that focus on LT’s interaction with the other units.  
We analyze all factors to answer how LT as a coordinating CFI team can make knowledge 
flow more efficient. In the following, we describe the relevant factors theoretically.  
2.3.2 Goal congruence 
Related to goal congruence, we perceive Aker Subsea as a team. We try to explain how LT, as 
part of that team, can act as a driving force to ensure a greater community of interest across 
both service bases and product groups. 
Team effectiveness requires that team members must be able to handle several tasks including 
the duties of their main task and the duties of the tasks of other team members.  This 
requirement can often lead to friction concerning how to allocate time, effort and attention to 
new tasks or new features. Several studies suggest that having a common goal (goal 
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congruence) strongly correlates with team effectiveness (Kristof-Brown and Stevens, 2001, 
Witt et al., 2001). Goal congruence is achieved when members agree on the importance and 
the priority of their goals (Vancouver et al., 1994). A goal can affect both individual and 
collective performance (Locke and Latham, 1990, O'Leary-Kelly et al., 1994). 
2.3.3 Team cohesion 
Team in this context comprises LT and service bases. Team cohesion consists of task 
cohesion and interpersonal cohesion (Carless and Paola, 2000, Zaccaro and Lowe, 1988). 
Task cohesion exists when team members are mutually committed to their team’s tasks 
(Hackman, 1992, Mullen and Copper, 1994). Task cohesion stimulates conformity and 
preserves the team members' orientation to the task (Man & Lam, 2003). Task-cohesive teams 
operate more efficiently if coordination increases between the members (Mullen and Copper, 
1994). In addition, task cohesion is necessary for the team to pursue its mission effectively, 
especially for CFI teams where members represent different expertise, functions and roles. 
These members are assigned to the team with specific purposes. Increased cooperation in the 
CFI team (LT) improves interaction amongst team members. The possibility to exchange 
opinions and experiences about the task increases as cooperation and interaction increase 
(Hirunyawipada et al., 2009). 
Interpersonal cohesion is based on personal relationships and friendships with other members 
of the group (Moorhead et al., 1998). Having a too high social context on a team – if 
interpersonal cohesion on a team is too high – can easily become counterproductive 
(Langfred, 2000). When members become too socially linked to each other, exchange of 
opinions within the team will be limited because members will tend to focus more on 
maintaining relationships by seeking greater consensus (Bateman et al., 1987). The challenge 
is to find a balance between task cohesion and interpersonal cohesion. 
2.3.4 Functional expertise and common knowledge 
CFI team members possess knowledge and are actors who play key roles in tacit sharing and 
transformation of knowledge. Team members' special skills (e.g. characteristics, 
predisposition, learning and experiences) that they bring into the team affect the 
transformation of tacit knowledge into collective knowledge (Odom and Pourjalali, 1996, 
Stonebraker and Hazeltine, 2004). 
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Tacit to collective knowledge transformation in a CFI team depends on the sharing of 
experience and on the application of tacit knowledge in a new context (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995). CFI team members need to have the appropriate skills to perform new product 
development or service-based tasks. Functional expertise reflects the employee's working 
knowledge, experience and skills in a particular subject. Put simply, it deals with the 
possession of exhaustive knowledge. Team members with functional expertise probably know 
how to treat functional tasks, solve problems and get relevant information, and therefore have 
more time to build their knowledge base and expertise in their fields.  
While a CFI team is developed to integrate expertise from different disciplines, it must form a 
common ground to initiate social and cognitive processes in the team. What the team 
members mutually know (common knowledge) can serve as a prerequisite for initiating good 
dialogues. Common knowledge is knowledge that team members possess (Grant, 1996). Such 
knowledge can be commonly accepted methods, skills, sharing of assets and so on (Dixon, 
2000). Common knowledge is essential for cross-functional learning (Grunwald and Kieser, 
2007; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Common knowledge allows individuals to share and 
integrate aspects of knowledge not shared between them (Grant, 1996).  
Different specialists use common knowledge (e.g. procedures for developing new products, 
technical component details, and general market perceptions) to begin the discussion and 
exchange of ideas. Through common knowledge, team members can share and access each 
other's domain-specific knowledge (Carlile, 2004). Common knowledge increases 
cooperation and coordination. Thus, team socialization is enhanced, which in turn promotes 
the tacit-to-collective knowledge transformation within a CFI team. 
2.3.5 Network centrality 
Network centrality refers to the degree to which an individual is connected to others in a 
network (Sparrow et al., 2001). It is the structural part of the individual’s relationships with 
other members, in their own team, in the organization and between organizations. Network 
centrality can be measured in degree – the number of members who have direct  relationships 
with the focal member, in proximity – the distance between the contact member and other 
network members, and in betweeness – the extent to which the focal member holds the 
position with the shortest distance between groups of other network members (Freeman, 
1979, Houston et al., 2004). When a CFI management recruits team members with high 
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network centrality this personal resource will enrich the team's socialization in three ways. 
First, (1) a person with a strong position in a network has the ability to access and control the 
flow of information (Houston et al., 2004). Critical information (such as previous projects, 
policies, crises, resources, situations and experiences) is stored within the employee’s faith 
and commitment and is valuable tacit knowledge (know how) that flows from workers (e.g. 
personnel at service bases) to a collection point or a CFI team member who has a central 
position in the network. The focal member´s network centrality gives him/her the opportunity 
to gather non-redundant information faster than others do. Second, (2) team members with 
strong network centrality develop a diversified knowledge base. Because they hold a superior 
position in the network, they tend to have contact with several other workers within their 
functions/disciplines, internally in the organization and externally in other organizations. 
Third, (3) members with a central network position also have a tendency to sustain their 
interaction and socialization with external parties even after they leave the CFI team. In case 
of job transfers from the CFI team to other units within the company, former members of the 
CFI team could serve as knowledge brokers by bringing to their new unit knowledge to share. 
2.3.6 Transformational leadership 
 A team leader who has overview of the development of products and/or service procedures 
may bring about an effective integration of various functions (Sobek et al., 1998). The head of 
a CFI team is committed to maintain project continuity by integrating various functions, 
fostering collaboration projects’ decision-making, monitoring and controlling information 
flow, negotiating with other managers, and so on (Grenny et al., 2007, Moenaert et al., 2000). 
Experienced managers can reduce communication costs and improve "credibility and 
knowledge codification" (Moenaert et al., 2000).  
It is not the amount of authority or power possessed by team managers or project managers, 
but rather their behavior and leadership styles that significantly affect the performance in CFI 
teams (Norrgren and Schaller, 1999). Their position of power in a CFI team also depends on 
how productive they are and on what value-adding effect they have. Elements of effective 
transformational leadership can affect team members' socialization and the effectiveness of 
tacit knowledge transformation. The idea is to facilitate personal values with the team's vision 
(inspirational motivation), to stimulate intellectual abilities  within the team (intellectual 
stimulation), and to treat and respect team members as individuals (individualized treatment). 
These elements significantly affect team performance (Hirunyawipada et al., 2009).  
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The transformational leader helps to adjust personal needs based on the team's collective 
interests and encourages members to act with a single mind in their assigned tasks (Jung and 
Avolio, 2000). A leader who initiates clear goals and expectations for CFI team members 
could increase team learning which in turn positively affects innovativeness (Sarin and 
McDermott, 2003). Several innovative leaders are using this "buy-in" approach effectively to 
foster team members' commitment to tasks and goals. Such an approach will in turn improve 
the members' interaction and increase the likelihood of sharing experiences with others. The 
innovative team leader purposefully delegates authority to team members, pushing them to 
experiment and to solve problems themselves (Barczak and Wilemon, 1989). Such behavior 
encourages team members to seek new ways of solving problems. This approach can enrich 
the sharing of experiences in the socialization mode and thus the transformation from tacit to 
collective knowledge is likely to improve.  
2.3.7 Summary of the conceptual framework of CFI teams 
Socialization is the underlying mechanism of knowledge conversion in a CFI team. In 
addition, it is important to focus on explicit knowledge sharing and on the use of 
technological tools for more efficient sharing of experiences and best practice.  
The efficiency of knowledge transformation in a CFI team depends on how much team 
socialization can be improved, both internally and with other business units. With this 
background, the focus is on various individual factors for LT as a CFI team (common 
knowledge, functional expertise, their network positions and transformational leadership), on 
the goal congruence between units in Aker Subsea and on team cohesiveness in the SLS 
department.  
This theoretical framework concerning CFI teams will both explain intra-team properties and 
knowledge flow between units. The analysis through this framework will create a picture of 
how LT as a central cross-functional service support contributes in creating a simpler, clearer 
and more systematic support and knowledge flow in Aker Subsea. 
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2.4 Barriers against knowledge sharing 
Coordination between different units/subsidiaries on a global level raises some organizational 
challenges. Porter mentions in the article Competing across Locations (1998) barriers such as 
language, culture, and geography in terms of communication and common ways of thinking. 
Foreign subsidiaries have a natural tendency to develop autonomy and extensively tailor their 
activities to local circumstances. In the same article, Porter mentions five approaches 
concerning how successful global players can handle these barriers through coordination. 
First (1) the company must have a well-defined global strategy that everyone can identify 
with. Second (2) subsidiary managers recognize the overall global position as a difficult-to-
match source of advantage in their particular country. Thus, they are careful to tailor their 
local activities in a way that will not undermine the global strategy. Third, (3) information 
systems are made consistent worldwide, facilitating operational coordination, the exchange of 
information comparisons across locations, and the making of appropriate tradeoffs. Fourth, 
(4) encourage personal relationships and learning among subsidiary managers, both to foster 
mutual understanding and to give coordination a human face. Fifth, (5) any company that 
seeks a global strategy must put in place an incentive system that weights overall contribution 
to the company in addition to subsidiary performance. We will discuss all these approaches in 
the analysis, but under different topics.  
In their book, Global Strategy and the Organization (2004), Gupta and Govindarajan discuss 
barriers and pitfalls associated with knowledge sharing in companies. The authors discuss 
barriers surrounding the social ecology, a term that implies a social system influencing 
people. The term is broad and covers culture, structure, information systems, reward and 
incentive systems, processes, people and managers. It is not a random collection of these 
items; they are put into a system where they interact with each other.  
Regarding knowledge preservation, a major barrier is the development of system and 
knowledge databases that are only a collection of one-upmanship. This barrier is called 
garbage in-garbage out, in line with Porter's third approach regarding consistent information. 
Mismatch between knowledge structure and sharing structure often results in random and ad 
hoc transmission channels. Use of e-mail rather than face-to-face contact or telephone 
communication is, for instance, a poor method for tacit knowledge sharing. In  addition, it is 
also important to set up efficient and commonly understood organizational paths to follow.  
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Gupta and Govindarajan (2004) discuss knowledge sharing and argue that the transmission 
mechanisms have to be appropriate for the type of knowledge being shared. Efficient 
transmission mechanisms (cost and speed of the transmission channels) are useless if they are 
not effective (if the recipient does not receive what the sender has sent). Efficiency is 
particularly important where tacit knowledge (communication, face-to-face contact, phone, 
transfer of personnel etc.) is most appropriate. With respect to the formation of a Hypertext 
structure, success is enhanced not only by forming a knowledge base, but also by increasing 
the amount of knowledge that actually is integrated and transformed into effective knowledge 
(DeLuca and Atuahene–Gima, 2007, Madhavan and Grover, 1998). A CFI team can enhance 
the integration of knowledge (e.g. product development, maintenance, technology, 
marketing), and this integration tends to incorporate important product attributes (Marsh and 
Stock, 2006). Such a team can thus serve as a mechanism to achieve both effective (response 
time) and efficient knowledge sharing. 
 
2.5 Critiques of the theoretical approach 
This study describes how Aker Subsea approaches a KG structure. The study’s intention is to 
provide the best possible balance between global integration and local response (between 
cost-economizing global standardization and value-creating local customization). It is 
important for this study’s credibility to point out that this approach is one of several ways of 
approaching the topic KG. Different trade-offs, processes and tools exist, or can be developed. 
For example, Zyngier et al. (2005) have developed a framework for conceptualizing 
Knowledge Management (KM), strategy development and implementation processes as key 
aspects of KG. Their focus is particularly on aspects of risk management and evaluation 
processes. Other scholars focus more on change management and diagnostic tools to facilitate 
the company's focus to a KM strategy. 
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3. Research method 
This study uses an exploratory design through a case study methodology. We collect data  
from only one company, but respondents represent different units in Aker Subsea. Such a 
qualitative research strategy is used to study a phenomenon in a systematic way (Saunders et 
al., 2007). The research strategy involves an empirical investigation of a phenomenon in a 
natural setting, using multiple data sources (Saunders et al., 2007). Robson (2002) defines this 
as "a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence”. 
Using case study design allows for seeing if the theories chosen are in line with the findings at 
the focal company. General conclusions would have limited applicability because of the focus 
on a single company. The next sections will give a more detailed picture of how data has been 
collected and analyzed. 
  
3.1 Data collection  
The most common form of data collection in case studies is interviews. Interviews are 
relevant for collecting non-numeric data, or data that are not quantified, namely qualitative 
data (Saunders et al., 2007). I have chosen to collect data through interviews with persons 
involved in various functions/units where I have studied the flow of knowledge: product 
group, service bases and the central support function (LT). I have also analyzed public 
documents and presentations by Aker Subsea.  
The interviews are semi-structured. Such interviews have predefined topics, issues and 
questions.  Yet, they allow adaptation to individual respondents (Saunders et al., 2007). The 
study is based on 11 interviews with 13 employees from two service bases (Angola and 
Ågotnes), SLS/LT and one specific product group. Each interview lasted between 45 to 90 
minutes.  
3.1.1 Design of questions for the interviews  
The theoretical framework has guided the development of an interview guide (in Appendix 3). 
Four interview guides have been used: one for LT employees, one for employees at service 
bases, one for the management in LT and one for the respondents from the product group. 
Most of the questions are similar but some issues have been approached differently for each 
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group of respondents. This method ensured that the questions covered the theoretical basis as 
well as being formulated in an open and appropriate manner. During the interviews, 
respondents were asked to cite practical examples. 
A flexible interview guide stimulated open, natural discussions, and in general the interviews 
functioned well. Respondents gave feedback on less successful aspects of their work. Such 
feedback helped me in describing and analyzing factors that work better than others at Aker 
Subsea and in their process to create an organizational structure where knowledge is governed 
efficiently.  
3.1.2 Execution of interviews  
It is challenging to ask questions, write notes, listen and plan follow-up questions all at once. I 
used a tape recorder during the interviews to enhance flexibility, i.e. to be able to concentrate 
and to follow up respondents’ answers. I transcribed interviews as soon as possible after the 
interviews when details were fresh in my mind. Using a tape recorder can have a negative 
aspect, however. Its use can cause respondents to become withdrawn and unwilling to provide 
all information (especially critiques) if they fear consequences for doing so. Respondents 
agreed to use a tape recorder during the interview. Most of the interviews were in Norwegian 
and I subsequently translated the quotes. The interviews were generally face-to-face, but two 
interviews were by telephone and one was via video conferencing. One challenge of doing 
telephone interviews is we cannot see the respondent´s body language, such as facial 
expressions and hand gestures. Therefore, it is more difficult to get an impression of whether 
they mean to communicate more than they do in words. Moreover, it is difficult to establish a 
trustful relationship by telephone. Generally, trust is easier to create in face-to-face 
interviews. Therefore, some respondents may have revealed in telephone interviews less than 
they would have revealed in a face-to-face interview. 
 
3.2 Analysis of collected data  
I have chosen to use a deductive and hybrid approach to analyze my data (Saunders et al., 
2007). Consequently, I have gone from theory to data using an established theoretical 
framework to better interpret data. It is important to be able to categorize the qualitative data. 
I have focused on a few overarching categories/topics which reflect my research problem and 
have placed the information received into these topics. This process is called coding 
(Saunders et al., 2007). Such coding gives a better overview and systematizes the information. 
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Coding has been a time consuming process and it has been difficult to plan a detailed coding 
procedure. During the coding process, I had to expand and merge some topics to get a better 
overview of the data. It has been important during coding to constantly look for correlations 
in the data to put information into a systematic layout. However, qualitative data makes it 
difficult to standardize respondents’ views and come up with general descriptions (external 
validity). I separated the collected information based on the different approaches in my 
research model (operation/authority, project structure/Lifecycle, mindset and best practices 
and knowledge base/coordination) and the factors underlying them. In this way I have 
managed to systematize the task and demonstrate an appropriate relationship between 
theory/research model and analysis.  
Expectations of findings are limited because Aker Subsea´s organizational change was carried 
out less than one year ago. Employees have not had time enough to become familiar with the 
new organizational form and all its advantages. Therefore, parts of the analysis will describe 
how different topics intend to be implemented. 
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Figure 6: Aker Subsea´s regions 
4. Description of case study/organization 
4.1 Aker Subsea and the Norway-Africa region  
Aker Subsea, a part of Aker Solutions, aims to have a leading position in the delivery of key 
subsea technologies. The company has about 6000 employees worldwide. In 2009 it was a 
NOK 13 Billion revenue business. They have had a solid growth in their top line recent years 
(from approximately NOK 7.5 Billion in 2005). One explanatory factor is a strong growth in 
Subsea Lifecycle Service (SLS) (Aker Subsea Presentation, 2010). In addition, they have 
managed to win a high percentage of projects in a difficult market. We study the following 
areas of Aker Subsea: their product groups and Subsea Lifecycle Services (SLS), which 
includes a central service support (LT) and service bases worldwide. Figure 3 illustrates the 
connection between the service bases and product groups. Aker Subsea is divided into five 
regions, as illustrated in figure 6 below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The focus is on Aker Subsea’s Norway-Africa Region, which includes the service bases in 
Angola and Ågotnes (Norway). Norway and Africa are combined into one region for practical 
reasons. Traditionally, much of the work for African projects are conducted in Norway due to 
a shortage of local personnel and expertise in Africa. However, a high proportion of local 
content is increasingly required. Therefore, Aker Subsea is trying to build capacity and 
expertise locally in all regions. Business volume in Africa is still not sufficient to require 
establishment of a separate regional business unit. The base in Angola has about 200 
employees, whereas the base in Ågotnes is the largest service base in all of Aker Subsea, 
employing over 400 people (SLS Presentation, 2009). 
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4.2 The development of a central support function 
Data indicates that the Dalia project (Angola) and the Reliance Project (India) largely were 
the projects that triggered the management decision to focus on developing local support and 
competence at regional service bases. Previously, Aker had no central function to facilitate 
service support. Therefore, service bases applied directly to product groups for service 
support. Dalia was the first Aker project in Angola, where Aker had no previous presence. 
Aker won the contract in 2001 and established the service base in 2004.  
The knowledge flow has often been based on individual's knowledge; individuals´ wander in 
the system. Sometimes individuals spread new knowledge as a result of job transfers, 
sometimes by bringing knowledge back to HQ from a project (respondent, LT). 
No system required units to share knowledge. Therefore, personnel shared knowledge only 
when units made specific requests of other units. Consequently, knowledge and competence 
were embedded in individuals rather than spread organization-wide, and the organization’s 
development thereby suffered. 
Experience from service handling after project delivery of the Dalia project was limited 
communication back to the people from the original project team. Service personnel 
especially struggled when there were problems offshore that needed quick response from 
product groups and/or the project management. These inquiries were in conflict with what 
was focused on at HQ. Product groups’ attitude was that they were only supposed to deliver 
their products and had little ownership of what happened after the delivery/handover. Former 
head of base in Angola during parts of the Dalia project went home to Norway in 2006. In his 
notebook he had a desire to start up a group supporting service bases. The support function 
“Aftermarket Technology” was established in 2006. The establishment of a central support 
function should support both product groups and service bases. It was important that service 
bases had an organization able to resolve technical queries submitted.  
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4.3 The improvement in June 2009: Lifecycle Technology (LT)  
The support function was created to support both service bases and product groups but they 
became very oriented towards the product groups and product development. This function did 
not satisfy the service bases’ needs. The 1st of June 2009 the product groups and service 
activity were clearly separated. Product development became purer while service support 
went into Subsea Lifecycle Services (SLS) (formerly called Aftermarket Services). This 
separation should strengthen both sides.  
All service bases were required to have access to engineering support. And engineering 
knowledge network developed with the intention of contact that is more regular. Former 
Aftermarket Technology became a more defined group of members from the various product-
related disciplines. The group was named Lifecycle Technology (LT), counting 19 members. 
LT´s staffing configuration is based on covering all engineering functions in Aker Subsea. 
Their goal is to have two members in each product discipline. Product groups acknowledge 
the need for a relieving intermediary group that can systematize and filter service related 
inquiries. This structuring of the approach to product groups ensures that problems are 
addressed to the person with knowledge to respond properly and saves both the service bases 
and the product groups for a lot of work. LT can answer requests more quickly. Regular 
weekly meetings are held to ensure that information and experiences from the bases are 
routed back. Technical inquiries are channeled back to LT and product groups in a systematic 
manner.  
According to theory, LT is organized as a permanent Cross-Functional Integration team (CFI-
team). The establishment of such a team is an attempt to break the different coordination 
barriers and interaction barriers. Their strategy/overall ambition is: 
The overall ambition for the LT group is to support the different SLS entities in order for them 
to meet the customer expectation with respect to local operations on all products and 
projects. The LT group shall also make sure that operational feedback is routed back to 
products and projects in a systematic way (LT Presentation, 2010). 
LT will be an accumulating unit and synergy manager in the dynamic process of knowledge 
between the operational service bases and technological and innovative product groups. Their 
role is ambitious because the service bases are dispersed around the world.  
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The group will support the various SLS bases in addition to route operational feedback back 
to product groups and projects in a systematic manner. Product knowledge, project 
knowledge, training and networks and practices are needed for this. Service bases should be 
made more independent of the product groups' support in their day-to-day business. LT aims 
to be a contributor in developing and implementing best practices, as well as making 
information flow between product groups and service bases more efficient.  
LT has designed some success factors, and it has been natural to focus on these factors in the 
analysis. The success factors are: (1) Commitment and follow up from SLS units – have to 
ensure proper service order agreement, hand over and start up – are still overall responsible 
vs. customer through service contract, (2) LT commitment – Services are performed, handled 
and solved in a professional way – capacity & competence and (3) Communication: Easy & 
clear process for ordering of work/getting support and clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities. 
The first success factor will be discussed when analyzing the project structure. The two other 
success factors are relevant when analyzing LT as a knowledge base in relation to CFI-team 
factors. 
4.4 What is supported by LT  
LT focuses on multi-discipline projects, or EPC projects (Engineering, Procurement and 
Construction). In such projects there is a great need of of support, because of the difficulty for 
service bases to maneuver around in the organization during large projects. Simpler "Stand-
alone projects" consists of fewer and clearer lines of communication between the project and 
the base. It is more one to one work relationship and easier to get attention. LT has weekly 
meetings with engineering points of contact from the base at Ågotnes, Angola, India and 
Houston. Although LT is a support function available for all service bases, it has been natural 
that there is most contact with Ågotnes, Angola and India because of the activity and need for 
support at these bases. The service base at Ågotnes is without doubt the largest base in SLS, 
and which is more independent than the bases in Angola and India. Anyway, the general 
impression is that LT should be an equally available third line support for all service bases in 
terms of use (as shown in the figure below).   
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Service bases are basically autonomous units handling their own projects and fields. Today, 
there is not much knowledge flow between the bases, except from employees moving around 
within the organization. LT´s benefit is that the group has updated information on operations 
on a global level. Experiences can be brought into new projects and other fields.  
One of the problems from the service bases point of view is that they have not become 
accustomed to LT and how they work. There are no specific barriers in the use of LT, but the 
bases should both have and want a better understanding of where and how they can use this 
group. There is both a communication line locally on the base that must improve in addition 
to LT´s prospectus where the bases can see what kind of expertise and applications that are 
intended for LT. LT`s prospectus will be easier to sell in when they have built up a track 
record and established a better “foothold” at the individual bases.  
It is a criticism of this study that it analyzes an organizational structure that has not quite 
taken hold and still is a relatively new phenomenon for the organization. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Support function matrix (LT Presentation, 2010) 
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5. Analysis of case study  
5.1 Aker Solutions’ choice of international strategy 
Aker Solutions returned to a regionalized international strategy in 2009, after having followed 
a global and standardized strategy. This global strategy was drawn up more than 10 years ago. 
Prior to this strategy, Aker Solutions was regionally oriented (as today), but through a simpler 
multidomestic strategy.  
The main reason for the strategic change is that the global strategy developed into a complex 
transnational matrix structure. It was quite common for middle managers to have three 
reporting lines with different roles in each reporting structure. The company experienced an 
extreme composition of support functions. The argument for this composition was that it 
enabled the company to handle and coordinate operations in order to ensure both local 
flexibility and the benefits of standardized global integration and efficiency. The internal 
bureaucracy increased, too many internal processes developed and the value chain went in 
circles and loops. The Matrix structure became very difficult to understand and few persons 
had clear ownership of their role.  
This global/transnational strategy became a "matrix monster" which the company could not 
control. They had to take action and their solution was to return to a strategy with more 
regionalized focus in order to slim the pyramid and downscale the company by removing 
unnecessary coordinator functions. Customer relationships significantly improved in a short 
time after the strategic change, indicating that their revised strategic focus already has 
produced benefits.  
5.1.1 The strategic impact for service bases in SLS  
Operational procedures have in the last 10 years changed from a multidomestic geographical 
focus, to a global focus implementing common standards at all bases. With the new strategy, 
they now return to a more regionalized focus. Personnel perceive global procedures often as 
too general, and thereby to difficult to adjust and to follow. Process owners were located 
centrally, making local adaptation harder.  
The understanding of local conditions was often not sufficient centrally. Service bases now 
observe a positive change in terms of documentation and procedures.  Because of existing 
SNF Report No. 24/10 
31 
 
global procedures, it is easier to adjust for local conditions than before. The bases have more 
freedom than before.  
Ågotnes has largely been involved in the design of global procedures, since they are a major 
part of the CoE in operational and service-related work. The procedures are naturally based on 
customer needs and are adapted to working routines at Ågotnes. Even though more 
responsibility and ownership is delegated to the various regions, the objective is that the 
global procedures and working methods still should be followed as far as possible. The 
improvement is that personnel can handle and adjust more effectively local issues now. 
Service bases’ perception of the strategic change is therefore positive.  
Personally, I am skeptical that each local base shall begin managing for themselves, but you 
have to adapt to customer requirements. The reason for regionalization is that we had one 
feature that should work worldwide. And you were sitting in Norway and then forgot the rest 
of the world. Hence, it was the region where the leader was situated which was favored and 
others were forgotten. It's that simple. If you were going up a level, up and back down to 
another department located in another country, then it was difficult. It is positive that we have 
line of responsibility instead of the matrix function (respondent, LT). 
Respondents at Ågotnes think that the change happened quite suddenly last year (2009). 
Support functions previously held globally became local and the base itself had to take 
responsibility for them. All major procurement processes, IT processes (SAP) and strategic 
processes were outsourced prior to the strategic change. After the change, the base had to 
carry out its own purchases, document review and SAP work. India previously handled much 
of Ågotnes’ support.   
The base at Ågotnes experience that economies of scale are not exploited as much now as 
before. Vendors still want to deliver by the global model. The perception at the base in 
Angola is more positive in relation to more control over own resources and opportunities. An 
example is the buying of products/tools that are cheaper in Malaysia than Tranby (Norway), 
or the buying of such products/tools from the external market if necessary. The quote below 
describes the issue regarding economies of scale vs. more decision-making authority on each 
service base:  
If you speak to Volvo, they will have this volume effect. They have standardization. We are a 
very project oriented company where every project is affected by what the customer wants. 
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We have very few standard products so we probably cannot exploit this volume effect fully. 
What would happen if you try to get this volume effect and you centralize this function at one 
place? The bureaucracy would increase, priorities might be different and somebody might 
eventually suffer (respondent, Angola base). 
Personnel perceive customer requirements as sufficiently different between service bases and 
it is difficult to set up a global organizational model. Service bases must have the freedom to 
make the organization as customer friendly as possible.  
Regardless of the organizational model, the different service bases are still interested in 
sharing of experiences, both within the region and between the regions. Important knowledge 
must be available to everyone. Such local adaptations that are now possible should not make 
Aker Subsea less able to share knowledge. It is certainly a challenge not to be too parochial 
and highly autonomous at the individual base. By supporting different bases worldwide, LT 
will gain from service bases unique experiences, which can be either spread explicitly or used 
in other supporting operations more indirectly and tacitly.  
5.1.2 Core technology - controlled regionalization for the products 
A system in Aker Subsea called "core technology" is developed and is owned by the product 
groups. The essence of this system is that bases must gain acceptance from the product groups 
in order to change design on core technology elements of the product. 
A challenge from having standardized global products and regionalized operations is that such 
a situation creates freedom to adjust and adapt the technology, which is often not beneficial. 
Extensive adjustments and changes to the products are controlled through Centers of 
Excellence (CoE) authority and the core technology system. The product groups have better 
control globally and the company retains advantages from the former global strategy. The 
reasoning is that the company will be global if it runs efficiently.  
In the longer run, it may be necessary to provide more authority to SLS for product changes. 
However, first it is important to create orderliness in the systems and to ensure  that they 
actually have proper "education" about updates and changes so that the true status always is 
available (the problem about the true status is described in Appendix 1: IT systems and 
transmission channels.) Once the true status is known, more authority will probably be 
delegated to service functions. The question will then be whether the authority for minor 
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changes should be located centrally or opened up for more local ownership at the bases. LT 
should have a coordinating role and have an overview of the various changes going on.  
LT should have enough knowledge to make modifications and take the responsibility because 
the product groups seem to focus on new projects and are not so concerned with the "old" 
which are delivered (respondent, LT). 
5.1.3 Regionalization of bases and centralization of service support (LT) 
LT operates across all regional borders. The strategic change still affects how the group can 
approach knowledge sharing in terms of how they present best practices and improvements in 
processes. According to the regional model, LT cannot impose initiatives on bases around the 
world. Therefore, LT must present best practice examples that are sufficiently appealing to the 
various service bases. In this way, they will reckon that being a part of this knowledge 
network is useful. In other words, there is a more global thinking in LT, but a democratic 
approach to the bases in terms of both implementation and reporting purposes.  
LT's mandate is to support the service bases with technical and operational knowledge. 
Regionalization of the operations at service bases requires more effort from LT. Respondents 
mean that technical knowledge is not as difficult to disseminate as organizational knowledge 
is. Technical knowledge more easily filters out local aspects. Support is handled in the same 
way in India, Malaysia, Angola and Ågotnes. LT members relate to the base in Angola just as 
much as they do to Ågotnes, although the geographic distance differs. The different bases 
have different ways of working, related to various customer requirements. 
Even in Norway, there were different customer requirements in the past. Now it´s only Statoil, 
but previously Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Saga had three different requirements (respondent, 
LT). 
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5.1.4 Summary on handling the international strategy 
 
 
5.2 Bureaucratic efficiency - preservation of global procedures and 
processes  
Concerning the regionalization of the strategy, SLS is now in a process of looking at the 
global and regional procedures for operating systems. The purpose is to map what should be 
mandatory and how much freedom should be left to each region. It will probably be more 
challenging to get the service bases continuously to follow recommendations made by CoE 
(SLS/LT and service base at Ågotnes). Although the operations are more regionalized, it is 
still important to follow global procedures as far as possible. If service bases become 
increasingly autonomous and self-controlled, they will have less opportunity to take 
advantage of other's experiences and best practice. Common procedures are therefore a 
foundation for a successful KG structure.  
Global procedures for service (SLS Operation Manual) have been too general and impractical. 
Less appropriate procedures are not followed up and revised. Under the global strategy, 
several bases struggled with a lag on many of the global procedures. The advantage of the 
global standard was that they had an “umbrella” for tasks that should be the same everywhere. 
SLS has formally moved away from this global thinking but it is important to  have a close 
Effect on : What effect:
Aker Subsea • Scaled-down bureaucracy.
• Easier roleclarification.
• Customer relationship already improved.
• Thefocus is still “thinking  globally, acting locally  ”. 
Service bases • More efficient local adaptation.
• Better control over resources, greater exposure of opportunities.
Product groups • CoE  authority and Core Technology: Still    control   over the   products.
• Hesitant to delegate authority to the service segment regarding change
in design.
Lifecycle Technology • Operates as a global  unit/group.
• Presentation of best practices even more important.
• Technical knowledge easier to transfer than organizational.
Table 1: Summary of Aker Subsea’s strategic choice 
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dialogue on the handling of procedures and processes because such dialogue gives direction to 
the bases. Unofficially, this topic was brought up and discussed during Aker Subsea’s 
Management Conference in March 2010. The issue is whether to proceed with global 
procedures. A proposal for continuation of the global procedures was well received by many 
bases.  
Most operations are the same. They should be the same. And it is very inefficient if we are 
about to build the same things at ten different places. By having a global process on top that 
everyone tries to follow, LT will also have a more natural function in recommending best 
practices to be followed (respondent, LT). 
5.2.1 Summary on global procedures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Distribution of authority in SLS  
5.3.1 LT ‘ s position in the organization chart 
LT's strategy shall be achieved through comprehensive product and project knowledge among 
the members, relevant training and a network centrality which makes the bases more 
independent of product groups and reduces response time on requests. LT shall also ensure 
that experience is shared with product groups and other service bases.  
It is a challenge to decide what kind of authority and mandate LT has or should have related 
to KG. On the organization chart, LT is positioned on the same level as the service bases and 
has no formal decision-making authority towards the bases. Through the regionalized 
international strategy, Aker Subsea delegates more authority to the various service bases. LT 
is thus dependent on strong lateral links, good dialogue and interaction across units. Their role 
is to gather various experiences in process architecture, and to a lesser extent, to exercise 
Table 2: Summary on global procedures 
Globale procedures
and  processes
• Global procedures for service have been too general and impractically 
developed.
• Proposal for continuation of more effective global procedures and execution 
models is well received by service bases.
• Although the operation is regionalized , common procedures  need to be the 
basis for effective knowledge sharing.
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control over the service bases. The group’s lack of formal authority and the fact that product 
groups are holding on to all decisions on changes in product design, forces LT as a knowledge 
base to develop persuasive arguments. But is there really a need to control the bases to a 
larger extent and a need to have a greater decision-making authority on the product side?  
The impression from members in LT split concerning the issue of their position on the 
organization chart. Some respondents agree that it would be easier if LT had more formal 
authority to overrule the bases if necessary. Now they have to work within the framework set 
by the bases. Thus, it becomes harder for LT to support the bases in situations where LT 
observes that the direction is inappropriate. Other respondents believe that more authority for 
LT could increase the distance between LT and the service bases.  
LT being raised “one notch” could have given us more control over how bases operate. On 
the other hand, such a position could soon have led to more distance from the bases and 
increased a "HQ-sense”. We are nothing but an ordinary service and support function. It is 
definitely an appropriate location for us given our being in the “Oslo-environment”. Not far 
from Tranby and we have good access to the product groups (respondent, LT). 
Most commonly, the knowledge flow consists of suggestions and requests from service bases. 
These flows are channeled through LT and directed to the management of SLS or product 
groups. Nor the product groups neither SLS centrally want that the service bases change 
products and/or procedures unless such changes are brought up with LT and the product 
groups. It is desirable that changes in product design are handled through LT, not because of 
the control aspect, but rather because they coordinate better the changes according to what 
other bases in the world are doing. Today, sufficiently clear guidelines do not exist and 
service bases only inform LT because doing so is as good practice. To avoid 
misunderstandings, clear policies are necessary. The company can make such policies without 
lifting LT on the organization chart.  
From the viewpoint of LT employees, the impression is that the bases often wish to manage 
the tasks themselves and are often reluctant towards LT´s involvement.  
You can ask critical questions, but people often go a bit defensive. Often, the issue is that 
people have done things wrong before which have to be done again, and this is a weak spot 
seen from a human perspective (respondent, LT). 
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One reason for skepticism by the bases could be the fear of the unknown. However, once LT 
overcomes such skepticism, they are likely to create a better tolerance in terms of feedback on 
how to handle problems.  
5.3.2 Clearer roles between service base and LT  
The majority of respondents in LT agree that they should have a greater governance authority 
to ensure that service bases operate according to the best available practice. This authority 
ensures that customers always receive the best available information and service. Feedback 
from the service base in Angola is that each service base should have the final word regarding 
what is best practice, but that they are, of course, open to suggestions. The issue concerns 
which unit has the final word if there are discrepancies.   
At the Kakinada base (India), LT has been involved from the outset in projects for the 
customer Reliance (Reliance KG-D6 and MA-D6) and has run weekly meetings with 
engineering personnel from the base and the customer (Reliance). LT has been able to show 
excellent response on technical challenges along the way through effective lines of 
communication and clear roles, keeping response time low. Reliance has been very interested 
in getting quick answers from LT as a central service function in Norway. LT has often been 
contacted in order to discuss recommendations from the service base and to check that the 
answers are "aligned".  
Cooperation with Reliance and with the base in India has been very positive and useful. The 
main reasons are that we had regular meetings with active participation from both sides and 
follow up of actions, resulting in a fast response time (respondent, LT). 
One issue that delays the response time, creates confusion and prevents knowledge sharing 
concerns authority. What is LT supposed to do versus what they can do? LT members have 
experienced many different ways of operating that they did not agree with, or that they might 
have corrected. However, the authority to make corrections does not correspond to their 
position today, and even less after the strategy changed from a global to more regionally 
focused one. The change in strategy is unfortunate for LT as a central service function 
because knowledge is not channeled in a satisfactory manner. Thus, chances of repeating the 
same mistakes on other bases increase.  
LT has struggled with its response time towards the base in Angola. Main reasons for this 
struggling have been confusing lines of responsibility and inadequate lines of communication 
SNF Report No. 24/10 
38 
 
between the customer, the service base and LT. There have been misunderstandings regarding 
expectations about who is supposed to bring technical offers to the customer. However, the 
general impression from the base in Angola is that they desire for such communication lines 
to be clarified before a job. In some cases, the customer wants the service base as a single 
point of contact. In other cases, it will be natural that LT has a direct contact with the 
customer.  
Knowledge flow and assistance are different. LT’s contribution to the project in India is likely 
to be defined as assistance, their role as that of an executor towards the customer. The 
question is how much knowledge base members in India share during the contributing 
process. In my view, LT is supposed to have a coordinating role in SLS to ensure the 
responsibility for the products´ lifecycle. Today, there are ambiguities regarding coordination, 
procedures and follow-up. LT should express clearer the fact that their role is to facilitate and 
coordinate knowledge. Such a role could both strengthen base personnel’s knowledge and 
help solve the authority problem. 
5.3.3 Separation of power 
Since LT was established, there has been some governance-related friction between the group 
and Ågotnes. SLS centrally and Ågotnes are in positions of CoE authority. Ågotnes firstly 
perceived LT as a bureaucratic department and an unnecessary feature. The LT group made 
more sense when it was required that there should be engineering support for service bases 
with few engineers. Engineering-wise, the employees at Ågotnes think that it is quite clear 
that they will handle the North Sea while LT should handle engineering support to other fields 
worldwide.  
The product groups should be the coordinating units. Our perception of LT’s authority is that 
it is equal to ours, but outside the Norwegian Continental Shelf; they support service bases by 
providing engineering assistance to Angola, Nigeria and India. Just as we support our fields 
like Kristin, Morvin etc. (respondent, Ågotnes base)  
Respondents from both LT and the service base at Ågotnes indicated that issues regarding 
what is "mine" and "yours" have been discussed in numerous meetings. Lately, communi-
cation between LT and Ågotnes has significantly improved and cooperation develops in the 
right direction. LT has contributed personnel to the base and improved interaction between 
the product groups, in order to enhance co-operation. The base at Ågotnes is the largest 
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contributor financially to the SLS, has the greatest expertise, and has the largest number of 
engineers. Such financially advantage do not mean, however, that they continuously operate 
according to best practice.  
As a major part of CoE on operational service, Ågotnes believe that they could manage the 
responsibility of supporting other bases. LT believes that Ågotnes has more than enough to do 
in providing support for their own operations and field of responsibility (North Sea). The 
service bases have to be customer oriented. Customer characteristics differ greatly on a global 
scale. Therefore, a customer-oriented service base is probably not suited for having a global 
coordinating function.  
Ågotnes directly approach the product groups with requests and do not see the effectiveness 
of terminating an already established communication line. LT is not established enough to be 
regarded as a more effective intermediary.  
I see that LT would like us to go to them with all our product related questions too, but we 
feel this is a delaying intermediary. We will go directly to the product groups with our issues, 
and LT should do the same with their requests. Otherwise, LT can easily become an 
additional bottleneck (respondent, Ågotnes base).  
However, the product group interviewed for this study would like a single contact – and 
dialogue system to relate to – but since Ågotnes are in a unique position with regard to 
engineering power and expertise, they would not make themselves dependent on LT.  
Among other things, we wanted to have a single contact system into our product group. SLS 
Ågotnes has so many talented engineers that it was agreed that they could arrange this 
themselves as a separate autonomous unit, while other bases go through LT with their 
requests. Then you have two systems that allow different approaches towards the product 
group (respondent, product group) 
The other service bases generally bring their inquiries to LT. In other words, two 
communication lines and two systems were developed initially: one line and system for 
Ågotnes and its customers, and one line and system for LT and its customers (the rest of the 
service bases). These communication lines should be completely aligned, which also is 
required by the recipient of the requests (product groups). A single system ensures that 
requests are gathered and systematized, and that several similar incidents can be 
SNF Report No. 24/10 
40 
 
Table 3: Summary of authority in SLS 
simultaneously dealt with effectively. Further cooperation on channeling of requests towards 
the product groups and on support should therefore be developed through active dialogue. 
 5.3.4 Summary of authority in SLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Project team organizational structure: SLS/LT involvement in project  
This section seeks to evaluate one of LT’s success factors: Commitment and follow up from 
SLS units – have to ensure proper service order agreement, hand over and start up – are still 
overall responsible vs. customer through service contract. 
The bulk of activities in Aker Subsea are project related and it is therefore important to have 
an organizational structure whereby service entities are involved both during the project and 
after the project is delivered to service bases for further operations. An SLS service manual 
should therefore have a model regarding service involvement in projects. Involvement under 
LT`s  position   the 
organization chart 
•Currently no formal decision  - making authority towards service bases.
•Shared impression about their position on the organization chart.
•LT depends on strong lateral links, good dialogue and interaction across units.
Clearer roles between 
service bases and LT 
•LT wants greater Governance authority to control and ensure that services bases
are operating in accordance with best practice. Does not have this authority 
today. 
•Issues regarding authority and mandate delay response time, create confusion 
and hinder knowledge sharing.
•Need a better understanding of the intention after handover of a project; who 
takes over the coordination role in SLS to continue focusing about the 
responsibility for the lifecycle of  products? 
•LT  should focus on improving    their role    as a facilitator and coordinator    for 
knowledge transfer instead of focusing on their role as an executor. 
Power Struggle •Different approaches to the various bases, in terms of capacity and competence
on the individual base.
•Instead of focusing on what is "mine" and "yours" the different units should
rather exploit LT ´s potential and what they can actually contribute with. 
•Further cooperation on channeling of requests towards product groups and 
support should be developed through active dialogue.
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the previously followed Project Model for Aker Subsea stopped when the project was handed 
over to the aftermarket/service base and the customer (same time). Therefore, the model did 
not cover how to install, test and operate.  
5.4.1 Project Execution Model (PEM) 
Ågotnes has developed a framework for service during a project. This framework is a 
continuation of Aker Subsea’s project model to cover the service life of products. A similar 
framework applies to recertification projects, which do not have product deliveries but rather 
maintenance and follow up. This new framework is called Project Execution Model (PEM).  
Under such PEM, a SLS Coordinator will be represented throughout the project period and 
SLS staff will be much more involved than before. Service personnel are present from the 
beginning of a project to achieve two main objectives: First, to bring SLS experience into as 
many project phases as possible (Design Reviews, testing etc.). Such personnel may come 
from service bases or from SLS centrally if certain SLS staff need such experiences. Second, 
to ensure that base personnel are prepared when they get the product and know how it should 
be run and installed.  
The worst thing a customer can see when he has a rig coming in a week is that the vendor is 
running around arguing about products and installation until the last minute and "fighting 
fire" (respondent, LT).  
Knowledge and experience regarding service and maintenance will be routed back through 
two channels: (1) directly to the product groups and (2) through the project. LT is a 
participating and coordinating group from project start, to ensure that knowledge flows 
between service base, project management and product groups. LT also holds knowledge and 
skills that can be brought into the different parts of the project.  
Goliat Project (Hammerfest/Barents Sea, Norway) is the pioneer project where a SLS project 
coordinator has been involved from the start. Members from LT are also integrated in the 
project and they are intended to participate and follow up throughout the project. LT´s role 
will be especially important when the project is handed over to the service base. Through this 
project structure one sees much more clearly the effect of LT and that the group will possess 
knowledge about the products and practice in the project. The organizational chart below 
describes the SLS Coordinator's position in the project structure. 
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Figure 8: Project structure with SLS coordinator (LT Presentation, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.2 New project structure - increased knowledge flow and lifecycle mindset  
Few people have participated in a complete project cycle. Manager in LT, Per Christian 
Eriksen, has been involved in a complete project cycle. He participated in the Dalia project 
(Angola) from its beginning, from building subsea trees at Tranby to the installation in 
Angola. Eventually, he gained much knowledge about the project and became a kind of 
"knowledge hub" for those who came later into the project. Mr. Eriksen witnessed the 
replacement of three project managers. New project managers did not have the unwritten 
history and therefore they often approached Eriksen on various issues, such as statements 
from the customer. Some customer personnel were present or involved throughout the project 
period and even a few years later. In such situations, the customer knew more about different 
Aker-related issues than the Aker staff did, which led to greater acceptance of what the 
customer claimed.  
Theoretically, there should be a formal handover by the project management when the 
products are handed over to the base. Until now, the dialogue between the service base and 
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the project has not been maintained after the products were delivered. The tendency has been 
that the aftermarket (service base) has been handed over the project. However, project 
personnel have not had time and capacity to deal with it anymore. Support and sharing of 
knowledge have ended precisely when the service personnel's needs have begun. Previous 
handovers also lacked documentation concerning the type of products delivered.  
After the Dalia project’s handover to the Angola service base, lines of communication 
between project and service base were almost completely cut. Feedback from personnel who 
had participated in the project often was that this project was delivered and done for their 
part (respondent, LT). 
This communication and support issue is now to be resolved by having an SLS coordinator in 
the project. Smooth handovers shall be ensured through SLS actively participating in design 
reviews and involving service considerations in projects. Participation in testing (System 
Integration Test) will also ensure that offshore personnel and personnel who will operate the 
products from the service base have experience on the relevant products. All products are 
tested together onshore by personnel who later will operate the products offshore. Previously, 
offshore personnel have been brought into projects for testing just before handover of the 
project and its products. In some cases, offshore personnel helicoptering to the field were 
browsing manuals for the first time. Such lax procedures in coordinating common knowledge 
make it difficult for offshore personnel to receive the necessary knowledge and skills that 
allow them effectively to perform their duties. 
To improve the flow of the products throughout their lifecycle, two approaches are 
considered. First, we consider the earlier involvement of service personnel in the project. 
Service personnel should take part in the reviews, experience how the products are developed 
and bring operational experience into the projects. The second approach is that personnel who 
developed the products in the project should also take care of post-handover service issues. 
Thereby, personnel with previous experience in the project will handle such issues. These 
approaches create consensus about the importance of and about priorities concerning the 
products throughout their lifecycle.  
Aker Subsea has begun to implement additional elements of this mindset in projects. If they 
succeed, this operating approach will be an incredibly powerful way to give Aker Subsea 
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employees an “efficiency boost” and to simultaneously increase the customer’s level of 
satisfaction.  
This way of coordinating operations requires close follow-up, communication and strong 
commitment from both product groups and service bases. Long-term thinking is absolutely 
the ambition, but the main challenge concerns availability of resources. Training and 
supervision throughout the project is a major economic issue. Both time and finances limit the 
testing regarding the capacity of test teams. The hope is that the Goliat project structure 
provides a visible value-added effect internally so it is easier to use the same model/structure 
on new projects. Then the engineers in SLS will handle the operational issues such as writing 
installation procedures and testing procedures, while product-group engineers handle 
production related work like design and documentation. The appropriate integration of 
expertise from various disciplines will help to define ownership and roles. If they manage 
having a close dialogue between various disciplines in the project, the vision of "the preferred 
partner subsea" is strengthened through increased socialization and team task cohesion. The 
project structure is shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 9: Project structure with SLS integrated (LT Presentation, 2010) 
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The figure below shows in detail SLS involvement in the various steps of the project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These figures illustrate the main point in the new value-chain thinking: "from cradle to 
grave". The attitude towards Aftermarket (now called SLS) has often been "to get the product 
out the door from the manufacturing and sent down to the service base so they could take over 
down there".  
The problem with previous handovers is that the products and maintenance procedures have 
not been in SAP. The latest project was Gimboa, where nothing was available in SAP. Then it 
had to be installed in SAP. This is very frustrating. There is something called "out of sight out 
of mind" and no one would take hold of it. The project delivery should have installed it in the 
first place. It turned out that we had to install it ourselves in Africa. The world goes on, and at 
the next project it might be better (respondent, LT). 
Among other things, on the Gimboa project there was lack of procedures to make 
demobilization of the products in the workshop for maintenance. The agreement in principle 
was that this should be done centrally at first, but the work has not been done and followed up 
even though the job is paid for and should be implemented (respondent, Angola base).  
These quotes explain the attitude of the aftermarket, which has been the reality until now.  
The wish is therefore that a number of different functions at the service base should be 
involved earlier into design view/review:  to play ball with those who are doing the work on 
the project side in Norway, to support them and give them our experience from day one. Then 
we probably avoid much of the "hicks-ups" and the problems we have experienced regarding 
previous handovers (respondent, Angola base). 
Figure 10: SLS/LT involvement in project development (LT Presentation, 2010) 
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Respondents at Ågotnes have pretty much the same opinions as those stated above, and 
previous handovers have been messy with many missed deliveries.  
Projects have often delivered more than they thought they were going to and shut down the 
project, while SLS has had a different expectation of what is needed from the projects in order 
to install the products. It has often been the case of test or operational procedures with the 
products. The project has often seen these as service bases’ responsibility, while we have had 
expectations to get this during the handover. Handling of documentation and responsibility 
processes have often been inadequate (respondent, Ågotnes base).  
According to the theoretical framework on organizational structure, Aker Subsea will, through 
their new project management, integrate better with the business system/routine operations. 
Knowledge obtained through the project is stored at SLS/LT as a knowledge base and later 
used and shared at service bases.  
The structure then covers the different layers, as described in the theory of Hypertext 
organizational structure, and also creates close links between them. However, Aker Subsea is 
far from implementing this structure efficiently.  
Challenges regarding the execution of projects will also be discussed further under the section 
covering goal congruence. 
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5.4.3 Summary of project team organizational structure 
 
 
 
General findings • The bulk of the activities of Aker Subsea is   project    based     , therefore, important 
to have an organizational structure where the service involved to a greater  
extent.
• Previous project manual in Aker Subsea stopped when the project was handed
over to the aftermarket/service base and customer.
Project based 
operation 
(PEM/SEM)
• SLS Coordinator represented throughout the project period and SLS staff will be
much more involved.
• Service personnel integrated in the project will   transfer   knowledge  and 
experience regarding maintenance and services to both project and product 
groups. 
• Goliat project is pioneer project for this structure. 
New project structure
gives more efficient
knowledge flow and 
lifecycle mindset
• Previous handovers lacked documentation concerning the type of equipment 
that was delivered.
• Early involvement of service personnel in the project will provide experience 
with the product and bring in operational experience. Product support later is
better clarified.
• Progression: More and more elements of this thinking is implemented. Potential 
for an incredibly powerful way of working that will give employees of Aker
Subsea an efficiency boost, while the customer will find that their vendor 
operates more complete.
• Main challenge for the full implementation is resources and economy. The wish
is that the Goliat project provides a visible value creation which makes it is easier
to use the same model in new projects . 
Table 4: Summary of project team organizational structure 
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5.5 Preservation and sharing best practice: voluntary or more mandatory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ability to make best practice shareable and enforceable depends largely on the issues 
described above regarding Aker Subsea’s strategic approach and organizational structure. To 
achieve an effective coordination and facilitation of best practice, the organizational structure 
must play a key role given that regionalization of bases makes developing global best 
practices more difficult. Service bases find themselves having different levels of capacity and 
knowledge and will therefore need a facilitator for practices that have been successful in other 
locations. LT plays an important coordinating role both in knowledge sharing and in creating 
a commitment to sharing and introducing of best practice.  
The question is how much effort they would put into sharing experiences; will each individual 
project or service base determine the level of effort?  
5.5.1 Sharing of operational experiences 
Respondents generally indicated that documentation of operational experience should be 
mandatory. One challenge is that offshore personnel who often experience important 
problems and situations leave as soon as they finish their job. There is little time for 
documentation and consequently important knowledge is lost.   
The service base at Ågotnes has decided to include a seventh man on the offshore crew who is 
supposed to be an administrative head. Areas of responsibility will be updating SAP,  writing 
reports and describing experiences. This person will report to the service base. (Only the 
Figure 11: Illustration of handling best practice 
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project leader reports to the customer.) Knowledge regarding issues and challenges offshore is 
a type of knowledge that is very important to developing effective service.  
This seventh-man position will be challenging to implement in Angola because of limited 
access to Internet offshore. Moreover, the respondents’ impression is that the customer 
probably would not pay for this service. This initiative allows sharing of experiences more 
systematically for the offshore personnel. Respondents generally indicated that they do not 
use enough time on evaluation of experiences.  
Especially in what was previously called Aftermarket you often ended up in such unstructured 
and informal situations. An example is working on a project that runs with good intention. 
Suddenly another project and new tasks are generated. To go back and clean up old tasks and 
create lessons learned (which is a very important aspect) have not been handled as it should 
(respondent, LT). 
Consistently following best practices for different tasks will be easier if workshops and 
lessons-learned meetings are made mandatory and if such regulations are then enforced in 
project contexts. Thus, lessons learned should have an important role prior to, during and after 
each project. In the short term, lessons learned may be regarded as resource-intensive but such 
an effort will maintain oversight and structure for both preservation and use of best practices.  
We try to establish best practice and provide lessons learned. This is difficult because much 
happens along the way and we do not have a uniform and a good structure for the collection 
of best practice as I see it today. I think LT could be a coordinator for this if they are able to 
go deep enough in the subject because it is very often on the detailed level that the good 
lessons learned are located (respondent, Ågotnes base).  
Knowledge and relationships you get through workshops or lessons-learned meetings are 
invaluable. These meetings are also arenas where different disciplines can come together, 
where knowledge sharing starts out as an informal socialization process and is later more 
formally documented as best practice.  
I don´t think sharing of experience is yet a high priority. We have enough with our daily 
problems and suddenly a new project arrives and we are not prepared (respondent, Angola 
base).  
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Aker Subsea must reserve time and resources for this effort in order to get effective and 
efficient sharing of experiences that to use in subsequent operations. The general feedback 
from both service bases and LT is that they do not use lessons learned from previous 
operations well enough. For example, they document hurriedly with inputs from bases in 
order to complete the project.  
Everything is very urgent and that is right to an extent because it is very expensive having a 
rig waiting for service personnel. However, one should actually be able to introduce the right 
things as a practice so they don´t need to go through it again (respondent, LT). 
One thing is to deliver the products; another thing is to deliver the documentation. In fact, the 
latter is the biggest challenge (respondent, Ågotnes base). 
LT has a natural coordinating role with respect to members' experience in various operations 
worldwide. Members from LT who have been involved in various projects are natural 
representatives at lessons-learned meetings and workshops both to provide technical feedback 
from similar operations and to preserve experiences for future projects. Central SLS, and 
preferably LT, should consistently focus on the fact that shared knowledge actually is used. at 
When projects start up the lifecycle mindset must be established, i.e. each project must be 
followed up from “cradle to grave”.  
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5.5.2 Summary of preservation and sharing of best practice 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Summary of best practice handling 
 
5.6 LT’s coordinating effect as a Cross-Functional Integration team  
The analysis of LT’s coordinating effect as a knowledge base is directly connected with the 
theoretical framework of a Cross-Functional Integration team (CFI team). Each factor will be 
analyzed separately.  
5.6.1 Goal congruence in Aker Subsea 
On a superior level, the different units are working towards the same strategic objectives. 
Nevertheless, the units often have conflicting agendas. One of the differences between the 
working environments in product groups and service bases is that the product groups (mainly 
situated in Oslo) are used to longer projects. Service bases are more familiar with ad hoc 
customer issues almost daily. LT is both aware of and familiar with the service bases’ 
working environment. The main challenge in creating stronger goal congruence is that the 
service bases are often handling "firefighting" and "quick fixes" instead of striving for a more 
holistic overview. Their operations could contain useful knowledge for others in SLS or Aker 
Subsea as a whole. There is more operational culture in the service bases, while there is more 
General • Facilitation and dissemination of best practice   depend   on the development of the 
international strategy, organizational structure   and  global procedures.
• Service bases on different levels   Capacity-wise      and       knowledge    -    -wise          and will  
therefore need LT as a facilitator of best practice.
• A crucial question is who should decide how strict implementation; SLS/LT ,
Project or service base?
Sharing   of 
operational
experiences
• Should be mandatory.  
• Offshore personnel are not able to provide adequate feedback.
• Workshops and  lessons    learned more mandatory in the project contexts, LT as  
a participating and coordinating group. 
• Large potential for improvement. Sharing of experiences should be a priority and 
resources should be allocated to this.
• Lifecycle approach and the whole picture must be established at the start of the
project so that each project gets this "cradle to grave" thinking.. 
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project culture in the product groups and HQ. These mindsets creates some environmental 
differences.  
There are cultural differences in the sense that Ågotnes repairs while Oslo builds 
(respondent, LT) 
It challenges a service base to be involved and committed to operations and projects beyond 
their fields. Each base has daily challenges that are customer specific, but the bases should 
also see the value of their individual achievement as a positive impact on the collective in 
SLS. This concept is challenging for LT’s part to marketing towards the service bases. If SLS 
as a whole manages to achieve such a common mindset, the opportunity for sharing 
experiences between service bases and LT will strengthen. Will to develop common goals 
often fails because of time and costs. The trend is that blinders cause an individual focus on 
each project. Regionalizing the strategy actually reinforces this view as it focuses increasingly 
on the governance of individual projects and less on responsibility beyond their own region.  
Until now, the responsibility to the supply chain has been more or less static. Project 
personnel are thinking of the project period and not adequately ensuring that the service bases 
should succeed in the handover and the continuation of the products and installations. The 
product groups have also been autonomous in relation to other product groups and “mentally 
finished” with their responsibility process when the product was delivered to the customer and 
service base.  
It´s clear that when we have delivered the product, the mindset is to a certain extent that we 
are done with it. This is what we want to steer away from (respondent, product group).  
Goal congruence needs to develop around creation of commitment and work towards the total 
bottom line. In the short term, perhaps changes and restructuring that lead towards common 
improvements are more costly for some individual units. This friction on how to allocate time, 
effort and attention should be resolved by finding common improvements that will not only 
provide economic benefits but also improve communication and goal congruence for Aker 
Subsea as an organization.   
LT is measured not only on financial numbers but also on interaction with bases and on 
successful missions. It is definitely inspiring to have such a group within the organization, a 
group allowed to experiment with new patterns of knowledge flow.  
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Many organizations need a major corporate cultural shift to change the employees' attitude 
towards sharing of knowledge. The establishment of LT is probably not effective enough to 
create commitment, to form a common platform in the entire organization. Respondents 
believe that the top management, established in 2008, has focused on how the various units 
should think strategically about common goals and about how to implement such thinking.  
In SLS there is an ongoing learning process regarding how individual contribution could 
benefit other units around the world. Service bases have not focused enough on this before. 
This continuous learning process forces the service bases to focus on more than just the bases’ 
needs and practices. Common understanding and interests will also be crucial for developing 
best practice and the lifecycle approach.  
Mini-Case: Cultural differences and corporate culture at the service base in Angola 
The freedom resulting from Aker Subsea’s strategic change has given greater responsibility to 
the service bases. They control more than before concerning how they follow global 
procedures and processes. It is crucial that they have access to other bases’ experiences and 
knowledge. The corporate culture is a key contributor in developing common goals and 
interests for knowledge sharing. Corporate culture is for some, however, a sensitive issue. I 
got the impression from several of the interviews that the corporate culture in Aker Subsea 
should be reinforced at bases abroad, and in my case in Angola. The base in Angola has many 
nationalities working together. Different nationalities have different approaches to the work. 
However, feedback indicates that having numerous nationalities working together does not 
pose any cultural challenges at the service base in Angola.  
Some of the local Angolans have attended a half-year training camp in Norway. Their 
learning about the Norwegian community in such a short time is insufficient to create a 
common identity and interests in business life. Therefore, the learning process must be 
continuous.  
You don´t become Norwegian overnight. It´s a long way before you start thinking like 
Scandinavians (respondent, LT).  
Significant effort has already been made to close the gap between national culture and 
corporate culture at the service base in Angola.  
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The first question that needs to be answered is:  Are they [Angolans] ready to be changed? 
Are they ready to be reformed? It is a balancing act to keep our company values alive and 
also get the best out of our workers (respondent, Angola base). 
People connected to Aker Subsea in Norway/Europe often struggle to understand the 
challenges of operating a service base in Angola compared with operating one in Norway. 
Those who experience this either by working at the Angolan base or being connected with it 
in another way, realize how challenging it is to work in Angola compared with working in 
Norway in terms of infrastructure, local conditions and culture.  
When we are in a meeting with personnel from Norway, they are on a completely different 
level than us. And that is true. We are struggling with the cultural differences and challenges 
every day and to make things go smoothly, while in Norway this is not a very big challenge 
and you can more easily step into the details and go deeper into the technical aspects 
(respondent, Angola base). 
Both project management and LT must have understanding of different approaches to tasks in 
other countries. In that way, service bases in other countries will appreciate more their 
support. In a MNC like Aker Subsea, managers must exploit the opportunities in the 
diversified cultures. 
There is no”one size fits all”, always unity and diversity. You have to keep the company 
culture alive and you need to make sure that you get the best out of the diversity you are faced 
with. If you try to change them, you will probably meet so much resistance that you will make 
them counterproductive (respondent, Angola base). 
At the base in Angola, 80% of the 200 employees are local Angolans. Many workers have 
family (cousins, uncles, etc.) also employed at the base. Regardless of such family 
relationships, it is important that all employees have a good understanding of work 
expectations. Respondents to this study also mention language as a barrier, especially in 
interaction with the local Angolans. 
A vague company culture would be a barrier to knowledge sharing because it develops large 
differences between the individual service bases and the support function.  
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Proposed initiative: Collaboration through a Project between SLS/LT and HR  
Most of the respondents cited that Aker does not take sufficient responsibility for training 
employees in cultural matters and in language before sending them abroad as expatriates.  
Knowledge sharing and creation is harder to achieve if such relational factors are not taken 
into account. One suggestion is that LT, in collaboration with the HR department, take the 
initiative to establish a cultural project for Aker Subsea with the purpose of educating future 
expatriates and foreign locals about commitment to and knowledge about the company 
culture, and about community of practice and language. Such a project could achieve 
relational effects like broader understanding and exploitation of a diversified variety that 
exists in this company. 
5.6.2 Interpersonal cohesion and task cohesion in LT 
These factors deal with LT´s success factors regarding Communication: (1) Easy & clear 
process for ordering of work/getting support and (2) Clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities. 
Interpersonal cohesion limited by transfer pricing of LT support? 
LT transfer prices their support towards the service bases. The transfer pricing system do not 
affect he product groups in their interaction with LT. They nevertheless set aside resources 
and labor to the group. LT, however, decreases the product groups’ costs in terms of 
systematizing and coordinating inquiries. So far, LT has done a lot of work that has been 
overhead on the team’s budget. An example of such work is upfront support, like 
presentations and public meetings.  
LT has sufficient knowledge and access to resources, which makes them the preferred service 
support source and far more effective than cheaper labor. Compared to external engineering 
services sold in Norway, LT’s services are certainly competitive on price. Anyway, the 
indicated use of LT causes financial strains for the service bases. The expectation of high 
quality is therefore great. The service bases are more excited about the result LT members are 
able to generate. A relevant question is whether such pricing of services may cause a 
reluctance to communicate openly and to share knowledge. It is difficult to define the transfer 
pricing as any barrier in this context, but respondents from service bases have reacted to this.  
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Hopefully, the company will budget central knowledge support in each future project 
avoiding large overhead costs at the service bases. This solution will eliminate financial 
friction between service bases and LT.    
Types of tasks  
Members in LT experience products and projects at various places in the world. Eventually, 
they will be able to see common features and common problems in the various fields. It is 
important for LT as a group clearly to signal/indicate what their members are intended to do 
according to their expertise. Until now, LT has largely taken care of all emerging requests as 
an attempt to promote them and to create goodwill and acceptance among the service bases. 
Their capacity has in certain times been fully booked. Respondents from LT explain that they 
are more selective now. Basic tasks dealing with daily operations are not tasks that LT 
envisages to support in the future. If inquiries regarding common operational tasks continue, 
service bases must consider hiring more staff at the bases.  
LT has continuously supported Ågotnes service base with 3–4 resources over the past year. 
LT shall be a buffer for competence and capacity. If the base at Ågotnes has a persistently 
great need of resources, it is important that they recruit to meet this need as long as the 
expertise exists. In the longer term, LT must be able to handle more projects abroad. We were 
able to support Ågotnes so much the first time largely due to the relatively low activity 
globally (respondent, LT). 
LT acts as a reactive group and is hesitant to become involved at service bases. A local 
viewpoint of the Angolan base is that understanding and goodwill from LT is needed to 
achieve effective support. The service base would like to develop a common agenda with LT 
based on cooperation, advices and inputs.  
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5.6.3 Competence and capacity in LT 
One of LT’s success factors is whether they possess demanded skills and capacity: LT 
commitment – Services are performed, handled and solved in a professional way – capacity & 
competence. 
Generally, most LT respondents state that their group should possess a comprehensive 
competence. The aim is to train the members so the whole group appears more versatile than 
today. LT must show that they can handle most operational and technical inquiries, which 
previously have gone directly to the product groups.  
Generally, LT members feel that they partially fulfill competence requirements. LT must 
acquire a higher level of competence to act as a knowledge base, and training has to increase. 
This issue also concerns the above discussion regarding LT’s routine tasks handled at each 
service base. The aim is to increase LT’s level of competence through: working with product 
groups on missions, (internal) training by the product groups, having members involved in 
testing of products and increasing offshore training.  
The knowledge and experience is also centralized within LT (respondent, Angola base). 
The service base at Ågotnes thinks that knowledge from LT is often good design knowledge 
and practical "how it should be" knowledge, whereas what they often need is "how it works in 
practice" knowledge. The service bases are constantly in dialogue with the customer. The 
customer may have different requirements and expectations than those planned for in Aker 
Subsea.  
A CFI team seek to integrate experience from different disciplines and they must form a 
common ground to initiate social and cognitive processes in the team. When this common 
platform is established, different approaches to the problem may be useful to reach an 
effective solution. Members from LT bring one type of knowledge and extract a different 
type. Common knowledge and understanding are created of both design and practice. This is 
also what Grant (1996) means in his theoretical statement: common knowledge allows 
individuals to share and integrate aspects of knowledge that is not shared between them.  
Feedback from the product group indicates that there is still a way to go concerning role 
clarification and concerning who intends to have most competence and capacity. Such 
clarification will affect the long-term strategy. The product groups would like to have the 
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product liability and to create strategies for the products in the long term. The aim should be 
to find out how the strategy elements of the service bases. SLS/LT and the product groups 
could be handled together to emphasize the relationship in their strategies.  
Ideally, the product groups make products suitable to the market, but suddenly the technology 
turns and they are stuck with products that are unsuitable for launch. The product group must 
be more involved than they have been in order to capture these elements in long-term 
strategic thinking. This is also the issue for the service units. It is important to create forums 
and good processes; this actually means that the strategy will be strong for the company. The 
impression is that there is a different approach to strategy that causes challenges in some 
places (respondent, product group). 
They (LT) ask relevant questions, go out and fix the problem. They have more frequent 
contact and easier entry at the bases (respondent, product group). 
5.6.4 Importance of LT’s network centrality 
The SLS organization is not too large to form informal networks. LT’s main contacts with the 
bases are dependent on a concentrated sample of contact persons. LT members create 
informal networks when they are supporting the bases.  
Informal networks are the best networks you have. Personnel who begin directly in Aker on 
bases have naturally not built up networks and will not have the same opportunity when they 
haven´t worked in the "basis". For us who have been in the business for some years, we have 
the network intact. On this basis, we have two categories of employees: those with Aker 
history and others (respondent, LT). 
Members in LT have strong positions in various networks and they can access, participate and 
control information flow. Their superior position in the network means they will have contact 
with many people within their subject field(s) internally in the organization and possibly with 
customers and suppliers. Information together with the member’s existing knowledge and 
commitment is valuable tacit knowledge (know-how) and members should share this 
internally and between service bases.  
We are expected to deliver the extra mile; to go the extra mile you must have a personal 
touch, you must have the human factor and the network (respondent, Angola base). 
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There is no explicit mapping or sharing of networks between LT members. Sharing is rather 
effected more indirectly by identifying who they think can be an “icebreaker”. A better 
mapping of such icebreaker positions in product groups and other functions would be an 
improvement for LT. Rating systems of competence would often be too casual but rather a 
"worth knowing" tool where contact persons are identified and their relevance to various 
issues.  
The company must preserve knowledge internally and this is certainly a big challenge. The 
informal network is only in addition to the formal structure. The formal structure takes care of 
the fact that people have different tasks at different times and the awareness that a lot can 
happen during a project or operation. Responsibilities and roles may change. The lack of 
dialogue between service bases makes LT and the members’ central location even more 
important.  
Feedback from the product group interviewed for this study indicates that Aker Subsea is 
currently establishing a global technology network. The purpose of establishing such a 
professional network is to take care of disciplines traditionally uncovered by the product 
groups. LT has a natural role in such a network as a contributor to effective communication 
and dialogue between the units. Such a “semi-formal” network is likely to make stronger 
relationships between the service bases as well.  
To rely simply on the system’s safeguarding all aspects without networking is something I 
don´t believe in. We have clearer roles and ownership; now there is an issue of fine-tuning so 
that everyone is aware of what the various roles possess. There is some “path-treading” to be 
done, but clear roles and ownership in addition to a good informal network on top of this is a 
good approach (respondent, product group).  
Respondents from the product group believe that it is very advantageous that LT has good 
access to them and that many members of LT have knowledge or experience from various 
fields/product groups.  
5.6.5 Potential for transformational leadership in LT 
LT wants to raise members’ competence and skills to a level that they easily could step in as 
task force leaders on demand. The management in LT should develop members’  technical 
knowledge in addition to developing the aspects that deal with customer handling, 
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presentation and instruction. So far, the head of the team and managers have handled these 
leadership tasks. To some extent it can be justified as sensible use of time and resources, but  
these leadership tasks eats up time that could have been used to solve technical problems.  
The LT management should still focus on developing LT as a knowledge group and on the 
strategic work related to this. And not focus on being a participating actor in operational tasks. 
The management should strive for better overview, predictability and longer-term focus than 
other group members have. A team leader who has overview of developing new products 
and/or service procedures will be able to steer towards a more effective integration of various 
functions, maintain dialogue with various projects, foster collaborative projects between 
service bases and product groups, monitor and control the information flow in and out of LT 
and negotiate with heads of bases and products. Such a leadership style will probably enhance 
team members' commitment to their duties.  
LT depend on their reputation as technology experts. If the group is able to demonstrate that, 
they have a value-added effect, other members will accord them an informal balance of power 
over time.  
In our system, the persons who manage to accomplish something and solve problems always 
possess freedom of movement (respondent, LT). 
The administration of activities for LT members is a challenging process due to fluctuating 
contract periods, normally ranging from three weeks to six months. Being detached from the 
operational tasks will provide the management greater opportunities to initiate clear goals and 
expectations through a closer monitoring and inspirational motivation. Increased supervision 
by the management will probably influence the effectiveness of members’ learning. 
Members’ ownership and sense of responsibility will increase if members are given tasks that 
involve leadership of task forces and handling challenging situations towards the customer.  
Managers possess the effectiveness possessed by the unit they lead (respondent, LT). 
5.6.6 Proposed initiatives  
Three initiatives are proposed to improve informal networking, coordinate knowledge flow 
more effectively and stimulate sharing of knowledge in the company. 
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Improved networking and strengthening of competence -  mentor program  
A mentor program is not highly developed in Aker Subsea. Today, a mentor program covers 
only the management level.  
In the initial phase for new employees, there is a “buddy system”. It is possible to develop this 
system further. The idea is to connect less experienced staff with knowledgeable and 
experienced people. Such relationships strengthen the network position of the less 
experienced and create mutual understanding and communication among different functions 
and areas. Experienced people can convert their tacit knowledge to collective knowledge 
through discussion in the mentor program. Such mentor programs could work both locally 
and globally.  
It's like football with the kids. It is not that there are some good and some bad players, but it 
is a lack in belief. Those people who are very skilled are of course good technically, but they 
also have faith in what they do (respondent, LT). 
LT has started to focus on some of the elements covered by a mentor program. Experienced 
members have responsibility internally towards the more inexperienced. Such a connection 
between individuals with the purpose of sharing experiences and knowledge is in principle 
how a mentor program works. Regardless of what LT has started, a mentor program in Aker 
Subsea could be formalized and prepared at a interdisciplinary level. A clarification of 
objectives for such a mentor program could more effectively stimulate sharing of knowledge.  
Competence and network building - engineering exchange  
This initiative looks at a rotation model regarding exchange of engineers between service 
bases, product groups and LT. Such a rotation model would elaborate interaction, increased 
coordination and common understanding of efficient and effective knowledge sharing. 
Connected to the theoretical framework of CFI team, it is possible that employees who have 
experience from a central support function will serve as knowledge brokers and motivators to 
bring back knowledge that can be shared.  
Until now, rotation of personnel has been random and demand-oriented in the short term. 
Since there are often relatively short and unpredictable rotation periods, exchange of 
competence does not provide certain competence gains. Firstly, a short exchange period 
would probably result in much haste and little time to adapt, evaluate and share knowledge. 
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Secondly, unsystematic rotation will be unmotivated in the long term. A systematic and 
controlled rotation system will more quickly produce diverse expertise.  
By the organizational change and the creation of LT in June 2009, the group was assigned 
people from various product groups. The composition, therefore, covers the various 
disciplines. Some of the members have experience overseas and offshore experience. But 
those members who have no offshore experience should get that experience. Previously, there 
was such a rotation system among engineers. They had 6–7 months offshore after they had 
been at Tranby (manufacturing) a year; then they were placed into the system in which they 
were intended to work. This rotation system should probably continue, especially concerning 
offshore experience. The feedback is that it is the restructuring in the company that has 
weakened the continuity of this rotation system (respondent, LT). 
This initiative is a far more expensive and challenging coordination initiative than a mentor 
program is. However, such involvement in various fields will have good effects, in terms of 
both sharing knowledge and creating a common understanding of the entire value chain.  
The service base at Ågotnes has already started a process, together with product groups, 
regarding how they can handle such an exchange program. The service base feels that such an 
exchange program should have been a global HR function. The initiative from the base at 
Ågotnes is based on contacts in their own network and on a random dialogue with projects to 
get permission to provide engineers for training and learning. Such exchange programs are 
not unique, and many companies have similar arrangements (e.g. FMC and Statoil). Today, 
such a program does not exist but is demanded by both LT and service bases.  
Strengthened commitment to sharing of knowledge - symbolic bonus scheme 
Today, there is no performance-based remuneration in Aker Subsea below the third level in 
the organization chart. The closest Aker Subsea gets to a bonus system is an expatriate 
agreement whereby employees get compensation for completing a contract abroad.  
A decade ago, bonuses were much more widespread in the company. Eventually, the bonus 
became an expected part of the employees’ salary. One reason may be that the bonus was 
probably based on the wrong performance indicators. The impression is that a new 
comprehensive bonus system would not be practicable or defensible on a cost basis. 
According to respondents, bonuses can be less comprehensive. Many possibilities exist to 
create bonuses as incentives for increased sharing and dissemination of knowledge. One 
SNF Report No. 24/10 
63 
 
example is to create smaller rewards that motivate and revive the sharing process. Smaller 
rewards and recognitions could increase reporting improvement proposals and suggestions for 
best practice. Such a reward system is supported both by members in LT and by service bases. 
A symbolic reward will probably create more unity than discord. 
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Table 6: Summary of LT as a coordinating team 
5.6.7 Summary of LT as a coordinating CFI team 
   
 
 
LT´  s coordinating effect as a CFI team
Common interests in
Aker Subsea
•Difficult to achieve, the goal is that each unit sees that individual achievement 
can have a positive impact on the collective in SLS.
•The friction on how to allocate time, effort and attention should be resolved by 
focusing on common improvements that affect the total.
•The establishment of a CFI team as LT is probably not enough effective to create
commitment to form common interests in the entire organization.
•Needs a corporate cultural shift to change the employees' attitude towards 
knowledge sharing.
•Mini- Case about cultural differences and corporate culture at the service base in 
Angola.
Team Cohesion in  SLS •Development of counterproductive Interpersonal cohesion are slowed down 
with transfer pricing of LT´ s  support. Not any barrier for use and probably an
effective precaution  for productive support. 
•Task cohesion and the development of LT members' competence  depend    on 
their involvement at bases and the type of work. 
•LT´s roles and the mapping of expertise is a suggestion for improvement. 
Functional Expertise
and Common
Knowledge, LT
•Composite experience and covering all product areas.
•Should possess a broad expertise. Today: some possess expertise in certain 
subject areas, a few versatile.
•Good design knowledge and practical "how it should be" knowledge, the   base
often needs "how does it work in practice" knowledge. Must provide a better 
understanding of each other.
•Still a new team and lacks some experience with the individual bases 
Network Centrality, 
  LT
•Important with relationships and personal awareness in a large organization
such as Aker Solutions and Aker Subsea
•LT´s superb positions for quick access to information and knowledge. This must 
be exploited.
•No explicit   effort on  sharing or mapping others' network, possible improvement: 
Overview of “Icebreakers”
•Informal network are only in addition to the formal structure 
Transformational
Leadership, LT
•The management too much involved in the operational work. Should focus more 
on dialogue with other units, long - term strategic work and facilitating for their  
own team members.
•Strong correlation between transformational leadership and development of
members' expertise and that they are comfortable with bigger Task Forces.
Proposed initiatives •Mentor program 
•Exchange  of Engineers 
•Symbolic Bonus Scheme 
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6. Conclusion  
This study has analyzed knowledge governance (KG) in Aker Subsea. The analysis focuses 
on how the company is approaching a change in international strategy from one of being a 
global transnational actor, to one of having a regionalized focus with Lifecycle Technology 
(LT) as a central coordinating function for service support. The study suggests that the 
different units in Aker Subsea are becoming more consistent. However, there is still a way to 
go to merge the various units’ strategic objectives.  
Aker Subsea is establishing a governance structure that could be very effective if they manage 
to implement and incorporate it effectively. We observe already positive trends in their 
project structure. Clearly, in project handling they are involving and aligning product 
development and service to a greater extent than before. Additionally, LT as a central cross-
functional service team would be able to coordinate and follow up service involvement in 
various projects.  
On the operational side in SLS, there is a challenge regarding how to distribute authority 
between service bases and LT. The objective should be a structure whereby service bases 
have freedom to execute their operations in relation to customer requirements. SLS/LT 
centrally should concentrate more on facilitating, coordinating and ensuring that knowledge 
flows both vertically (product group-LT-service base) and horizontally (service base-LT-
service base). This knowledge flow deals with preserving and diffusing best practice as well 
as tailoring procedures and processes towards the various service bases.  
LT’s coordinating and interacting effect as a cross-functional integration team (CFI team) has 
been analyzed with respect to both inter-team factors (goal congruence and team cohesion) 
and intra-team factors (common knowledge, functional expertise and network centrality). 
These factor-based assumptions were largely taken into account when establishing LT, but are 
still not fully developed. LT’s expertise must over time evolve them to emerge as highly 
value-added for the service bases. LT must increasingly exploit this value-adding position 
between the product groups and service bases to increase coordination. LT’s ambition is to be 
a knowledge base through sharing relevant knowledge and experience. Product groups and LT 
will develop and disseminate globally applicable solutions, while the service bases deal with 
local adaptations.  
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Considering network centrality, LT’s location is strategically good in terms of close 
interaction with product groups. There is still potential for increased understanding of the use 
of LT and interaction with service bases through better networking. Such an understanding is 
also a factor that will develop when Aker Subsea SLS implements the PEM/SEM model for 
project involvement.  
It is clear that Aker Subsea’s choice of an international strategy affects how the organizational 
structure is adapted for efficient approach to KG. This KG deals with both the knowledge 
flow between the units and the coordination properties of a CFI team such as LT. Today, the 
respondents in this study do not think there are enough resources and setup to implement all 
aspects of the new project structure.  
Aker Subsea should continue implementing aspects of effective KG in other projects. The aim 
and ambition is in place. Their planned organizational structure could be an incredibly 
powerful way of working, simultaneously having effect both internally and towards the 
customer.  
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Appendix 1: Description of IT systems and transmission channels 
in Aker Subsea  
In order to develop effective processes and organizational structure an important key word is 
TRUE STATUS; the products are updated, maintained and followed up. The aim for this 
study is not to analyze the IT systems in detail but it is useful to give a description of the 
systems available today for KG purposes. The analysis also refers to SAP in different 
contexts. This section is even though not that relevant for my case study and therefore 
enclosed in Appendix. 
 
SAP  
The IT system used in Aker is SAP. SAP is described often as the heart of the operation. 
Documentation, product descriptions, procedures, certificates, and different calculation are 
available in SAP. Changes and upgrades on the products are fed into the system by onshore 
personnel. Needs for the system are directed to IT manager for Aker Subsea and the inquiry 
will eventually be lifted up into Aker Business Services which is the IT department in Aker 
Solutions. This is the way to go if you want changes and upgrades on the system.  
My impression is that we don´t have any impact on SAP (respondent, LT). 
After the system was rolled out (not before) SLS has played a larger role regarding issues 
during the development of "SAP Next Level". SLS has represented needs from service bases 
but have not had enough power. In addition, there have also been challenges around different 
needs within SLS. The base at Ågotnes would openly like a system that is more functional for 
their use. They have specific wishes especially in engineering. Other bases have different 
wishes.  
The needs are often more or less the same at bases but often there are different SAP setups 
and use for it. There has not been enough coordination. We (LT) have no defined area of 
responsibilities and therefore dependent on that people sees the effect of us being involved. 
This is not a successful structure (respondent, LT).  
This random involvement is not a successful structure and there is clearly necessitate 
centralizing and collecting information about the needs to create a common system that 
possesses the widest choice from all bases. SLS is one of the units that use SAP most as end-
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users. The projects use SAP for purchasing but SLS is completely dependent on life cycle 
information in SAP and its true status. Contemporary information in SAP is essential for 
service personnel who use SAP for many years after the project is completed. LT holds an 
important coordinating role, and as a driving force to promote and collect needs of the system.  
The whole point with SAP is to find the way out of the woods eventually and also find out 
which way you went out of the woods. Today this is pretty much impossible. A lot of people 
are “buzzing” around in the woods doing something. Lost in SAP ... (respondent, LT). 
There is also developed a system in SAP which is used to find information about errors and 
deficiencies of various types of products. This system is called NCR (Non Conformancy 
Reporting System). This system is relatively new and was fully started at Ågotnes in 
June/July 2009. A learning process is going on where one gets training on how to enter good 
NCR´s. The desire is to get the operators at the bases also to report improvements. Today this 
system only reports errors and defects. 
One major challenge is that there often are made changes to the product which is not fully 
updated in SAP. This information should have been available immediately. People´s 
carelessness with updating makes true status not available and much extra work for those who 
solve problems offshore. This friction explains the challenge on responsibility and loyalty to 
the entire lifecycle. 
The barrier is that the operating personnel at the base are using the system too little. They 
have been trained on the system but many of these people have worked for many years and 
based on experience, they have climbed the hierarchical ladder. Many people have resistance 
to IT and further development in this area is a challenge. There is also little demand for the 
use and therefore many do not use this (respondent, LT).  
It has to be ensured that both experienced and inexperienced engineers are pulling in the same 
direction towards an IT system that provides information flow and efficient use. This is 
achieved by setting the requirement that the system is used correctly and additional training 
and follow-up on IT skills.  
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Integrated Operation: communication between offshore and onshore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Integrated Operation (IO) is the concept of communication between offshore and onshore 
(base and HQ). This is a communication line that SLS has largely influence over but is still 
lacking structure and technology. Today's communication between onshore and offshore is 
basically handled by phone and e-mail. Knowledge from individual tasks offshore is not 
appropriately shared and experiences are often not returned to shore. Experiences logged 
offshore are not utilized enough and returned to base and LT. Operations move on with no 
reason for improvements and best practice. LT is first informed when an error or a problem 
occurs.  
At the base in Angola the communication providing offshore personnel access to operating 
system is not developed. Based on the infrastructure communication is handled by e-mail or 
telephone. This is a major constraint in how they communicate, report and handle updates on 
products. The same challenges have been experienced between onshore and offshore at 
Ågotnes. Now, however, they are moving in the direction that SAP will be used more 
offshore too. They have also invested in products for a more efficient integrated operation 
system. Through live transmissions using videoconferencing products on large screens they 
are able to have standard meetings with offshore personnel where engineers and project 
managers can run morning meetings regarding daily operational processes, go through critical 
points and procedures. Such an IO system will reduce operational costs and also result in a 
better flow of information and knowledge in both directions; Offshore and Onshore. This 
effort started in 2010 at Ågotnes.  
Figure 12: Illustrating pictures of Integrated Operation (LT Presentation, 2010) 
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MySubsea  
This IT system is a portal which is provided to customers and external companies. External 
parties can buy a license to get access to a limited part of Aker Subsea´s SAP (their project 
area). Here you will find various documentation, product descriptions and certification. There 
is still a way to go to get rolled out MySubsea and preliminary it is only used in the UK for 
Controls projects. But this tool will be appreciated by the customer and possibly create better 
dialogue between external parts and Aker Subsea. 
First interactive 
First Interactive is a simulation system that runs simulation and training of offshore personnel 
on control systems offshore. The ambition is to take this IT tool one step further so that it is 
linked to operations offshore live. When products are running out and being installed onshore 
personnel can monitor the simulation.  
Database for sharing operational experience 
Various projects have previously developed common experience databases, but such 
databases have not been followed up after project termination. Today no experience databases 
are continuously operational. Many different systems for sharing of experiences have been 
tried out, but have not turned out successfully. People have not known where to enter or what 
to write. This has led to what is described in the theory as "garbage in, garbage out" and 
reported experience has not been used by others for similar tasks. Different questionnaires 
have been developed in project contexts without success. There has been a mismatch in the 
extent of required experience in relation to what has been experienced in operations. 
Feedback from service bases, however, is that there certainly is a need for a common database 
where they can retrieve information and knowledge.  
As described in the section on SAP a NCR system in SAP is developed for deviation control 
where you can find the history of products and tooling used in different operations. Any errors 
and defects detected are registered here. But this system does not take care of operational 
history and suggestions for improvements. Operational knowledge is demanding and should 
definitely be preserved and shared to promote development that creates competitive 
advantage.  
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By the end of 2009 a database called Lesson learned was launched. The database is accessible 
via the intranet, covering (unlike previous databases) operational history from both projects 
and service. One of the biggest challenges for this being a success is turning people's 
impression of such databases and actually start using them. To achieve this, the system must 
be structured, searchable and usable. The problem is not lack of access to information but the 
quality on the information. 
It is too early to give any adequate analysis of whether this database will be any success. The 
reason is that the database is brand new as well as the intended structure around workshops 
and lessons learned meetings. The database relay on having such structures and forums where 
experiences are discussed and put into a bigger picture.  This database is not currently very 
"heavy" marketed. The plan is to slowly begin using it now before it is launched properly. 
The optimal IT model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The optimal IT model is not yet properly installed in Aker Subsea and there are many 
challenges related to communication between offshore and onshore. In addition, there are also 
challenges of having available true status on documentation in SAP, which results in a lot of 
Figure 13: The optimal IT model 
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extra work for the individual service worker, regardless of whether you work in Angola, 
Ågotnes or LT. A system that integrates offshore and onshore service base and central support 
is a critical need for SLS in their development towards better knowledge sharing and 
preservation.  
An ambition for the future is that operations are transferred virtually with a close dialogue 
between first to third line of support (as illustrated in figure 7). The technology exists to a 
large extent today. But it is not easy to get SAP to talk the same language as the other 
communication tools. This link is critical to have access to all documentation on products 
used. The idea is that you can go through MySubsea (external and customers) or First 
Interactive to get access to when and where the products is manufactured, repaired, used 
offshore, etc. Much the same model as in the automotive industry and which should be 
implemented in a high-tech organization as Aker Subsea. The customer also demand this true 
status on products used on the rig. In addition, a system for effective knowledge sharing of 
operational experience is established.  
Other transmission channels 
Most of the respondents in this study believe that it is best to meet each other face to face and 
build relations. Socialization gives a better perception on whether the recipient understands 
what you say. Because of the distances between service bases and LT it is difficult with such 
face to face meetings very often. The respondents’ point of views is to prioritize face-to-face 
meetings when having workshops or at project start. Then it will be easier to continue with 
video conferencing and telephone meetings because you have got a good impression of who 
you are working with and a better understanding of each other. Videoconference is a channel 
that SLS uses to a large extent and are willing to use even more in the future. So far it has 
worked poorly with Angola due to technical problems and delays on the line. Towards 
Ågotnes there is only positive feedback in connection with the use of videoconference.  
There is a mixed response regarding the respondent´s impression of using e-mail for sharing 
knowledge. Some believe that this is a powerful medium where you can share documents and 
other technical details. The disadvantage of e-mail is that text can be interpreted from its 
original context because of reading only what is related to yourself or your group.  
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Through the intranet you can find procedures and a sharing tool called SharePoint. SharePoint 
is actively used on the intranet as a kind of work list. Work is published and different people 
process the tasks and post their work online.  
Geographic distance is still considered a challenge by the personnel involved. Essentially it's 
about having members from LT working nearby, bring them to customer meetings and work 
under the same premises. This is also because face-to-face interaction is preferred. For 
projects which cover travel costs this is a challenge cost-wise. It is not always sure that the 
customer would find it natural that they should cover this cost. In the long term the objective 
must be to an even greater extent using videoconferencing as a tool for sharing knowledge 
and support. But this depends of course on the scope of the task and the importance of 
presence at the service base. 
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Appendix 2: Description of relevant projects mentioned in the 
study 
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Appendix 3: Interview guide 
Four different interview guides are used in the study: (1) LT employees, (2) employees at 
service bases, (3) the management in LT and (4) respondents from the product group. Most of 
the questions have been the same but some issues have had different approaches for each 
group of respondents. This interview guide gathers all questions.  
 
KG structure and the establishment of LT  
Everyone 
1. How was the support and knowledge flow handled earlier?  
2. Is it true that the establishment of LT as a centralized unit detached from the business 
units is helping to facilitate and coordinate knowledge and is this unit considered 
supportive for all the bases and product groups? Thus Aker Subsea?  
a. Was the responsibility for sharing and storing knowledge left to the individual 
bases or certain employees even though the development of the organizational 
knowledge base always has been considered important for the organization? A 
common desire for a collective and integrated effort across departments?  
3. LT should help overcoming the "silo effect" around the service bases and product 
groups. Has centralization helped to improve standards and efficiency in operations 
and created to a better dialogue between the product groups and bases?  
4. Is the size of the organization challenging in order to create good informal network?  
a. Is it preferable to have a more formal structure for support and knowledge 
sharing (depending on roles) rather than an informal and person dependent 
approach?  
Service Bases  
5. What do you think is new with the concept of LT? 
a. Is the support and involvement by LT appreciated at your base?  
6. Have bases had any influence on how the LT organization should be structured and 
organized?  
LT Management 
7. Could LT be characterized as a shadow organization with "dotted lines" which goes a 
little bit across command lines? 
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8. What was implemented through the introduction of the LT? 
a. Key elements, coordination and management measures already in place before 
the formation of LT? 
b. Were any previous support functions combined in LT? 
c. Create a timeline of the various activities that have taken place after the 
establishment LT. 
9.  Is it Odd Egil Haug (Vice President) who owns the LT strategy? 
a. Included the strategy formulation an assessment of the organization's strengths 
and weaknesses regarding Knowledge flow objectives, identification of 
organizational knowledge needs, and a roadmap for the development of tools 
and practices in order to support bases and product departments? 
b. Have there been any follow-up regarding the strategy and do you keep steady 
course? 
10. Could the group have had a higher status by collecting more expertise in LT? 
a. What kind of expertise should LT possess? Expertise, coordination skills, 
broad and general competence? 
 
KG processes  
Everyone 
7. Common interests between bases and HQ (work toward common goals)?  
8. Felt any differences after Aker Solutions changed from a global strategy to a 
more regional?  
a. Last year all the procedures were more mandatory (global), everything 
was more global. Gone back to being five regions where each region has 
more freedom to do what they want within a certain framework and Aker 
Subsea set the values, etc. Within the SLS they also have certain 
procedures that everyone must follow (reporting, procedures).  
9. What is your experience with the success factors of LT:  
a. LT commitment - Services are performed, handled and solved in a 
professional way - capacity & competence  
i. As a capacity and competence hub  
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b. Commitment and follow up from SLS units - have to ensure proper 
service order agreement, hand over and start up - are still overall 
responsible vs. customer service through contract.  
i. More focus on and responsibility for the entire value chain  
ii. Training and follow-up, especially in the handover process from 
project to base   
Service Bases 
10. Do you see the usefulness of sharing experiences within the SLS by using LT?  
11. How to implement best practice? Voluntarily?  
a.  In a way, more global thinking in LT but a quite democratic approach to 
the bases? 
12. Does LT manage to create effort and commitment at your base?  
a.  Willingness to share when you pay for the service?  
b. Do you feel that it is too expensive to use LT? (NOK 700-900 per hour)  
c. Have you considered buying/bought this capacity/support externally?  
13. How is the difference in knowledge sharing when LT is located at the base and 
when it is supported from distance (Oslo/Bergen)?  
LT staff 
14. LT thinks more globally and operates across borders. This means that one must 
focus on the way things are presented and disclosed. According to the regional 
model LT cannot impose things to bases outside their CoE just because it is 
determined in Norway. Therefore it is important to present a best practice useful 
for the bases. How does this democratic process work? 
15. Is LT able to create effort and commitment at the various bases? 
a. Willingness to share with the bases when they pay for your service? 
b. How do you see that it costs money for service internally? High threshold 
for use? 
LT Management 
16. What projects have been introduced so far regarding increased knowledge flow 
between the units?  
17. Considered a partnership with the HR department with a goal of developing 
learning modules and obligations to the bases? 
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a. Could LT be working closer with HR in order to level cultural 
differences? 
 
Communication and coordination processes  
Everyone 
18. Do you feel recognized for the work of sharing knowledge?  
a. Proposal for how to promote and premiere sharing initiatives?  
b.  Incentive programs?  
19.  What do you think of a mentor program between base/LT/product groups/ 
management?  
20. What is your experience with the success factors of LT:  
a. Easy & clear process for the ordering of work/getting support  
b. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities internally  
c. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities vs. external customer bases  
21. Enough integrated with IT systems? Development of the systems and transfer and 
integration of knowledge based on experience (SAP, MySubsea, First Interactive 
+ Offshore and Onshore) 
22. What about sharing the transmission channels used? Face to face, intranet, video 
conference, phone, e-mail. What is preferred? 
Service Bases 
23. How is knowledge shared between the base and LT/HQ?  
a. Dedicated key personnel who are responsible (Engineering points of 
contact)?  
b. How do you report on improvement potentials?  
i. Monthly meetings that go through local, regional and global 
AKSO activities, technical problems and improvements?  
c. Should the workshops, meetings and monitoring/reporting be more 
mandatory?  
24. How efficient to share experiences with others and how susceptible to others' 
experiences? (inflow/outflow) 
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25. Some power struggle between the bases?  
26. Cultural and geographical barriers to overcome? 
Product Group 
27. How do you utilize and use the experience brought by LT? 
a. Are experiences routed back to them and is there a better dialogue 
between the bases and product groups? 
 
Leadership (LT staff)  
28. Enough support from top level and effectiveness in LT? How do you make 
implementations and are there formal management teams where LT has a natural 
position? 
a. Initiatives that has a larger organizational impact, must be approved by 
higher organizational level? Thinking of warranty handling which is 
largely designed by LT and implemented through CEO Aker Subsea. 
Other examples? 
29. How much authority and responsibility among the employees in LT? 
 
 
